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THE SECOND AMENDMENT AS INTERPRETED BY
CONGRESS AND THE COURT
Sean JKealy*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last two years, the U.S. Supreme Court has finally offered
a reasoned interpretation of the Second Amendment. By the slimmest
of majorities in District of Columbia v. Heller- and McDonald v. City
of Chicago,2 the Court held that the Second Amendment supplies an
individually-held right to bear arms; the government may place reasonable
restrictions on gun ownership, but neither the federal government nor an
individual state can deprive a person of their right to possess a handgun.
Despite many pages of opinion, however, the majority in Heller offers
an unsatisfying explanation for why the Second Amendment protects
an individual's right to bear arms. Whether the Second Amendment
should be construed as an individual or collective right will probably be a
continuing debate and, should the composition of the Court change in the
near future, there could be another landmark gun decision with profound
implications on Second Amendment jurisprudence. Meanwhile, the
Heller and McDonald opinions do little, if anything, to resolve the gun
debate in the United States.
This article offers a different perspective on the right to bear arms
from those given in Heller. Section II analyzes Justice Scalia's finding
that an individual's right to bear arms is derived from a received British
right that was codified into the Constitution. Instead, I argue that the
Amendment was a very practical solution to a defect in the original
Constitution. The power-sharing relationship between the federal and
state governments over the militia at the time the Constitution was signed
was confusing and potentially dangerous to the security of the states. I
argue that the right to bear arms was intended as an individual right and

1

Clinical Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. The
author thanks Brian Foley, Stacey Bloom, David Breen, Gerald Leonard and
Stephen Gomez for their helpful thoughts and suggestions on the drafts of this
article.
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).

2

130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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was essential for ensuring that local, state, and federal governments could
meet their obligation to provide for a common defense. This common
defense was not comprised only of the military actions associated with
invasions and insurrections, but also included enforcing the civil law on
every level of government.
Section III criticizes the Court, not just for the Heller decision, but
also for the one previous Supreme Court Second Amendment precedent,
Miller, for interpreting the Second Amendment as if its role, scope, and
meaning have not changed since the First Congress. Others have argued
convincingly that, during Reconstruction, the Second Amendment was
transformed from a political right held by voters to a civil right held by
all individuals. In addition to this legal shift, during the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, the needs of society changed dramatically. By the
1930s, the common defense was largely provided by a professional federal
military and professional law enforcement at all levels of government.
While the Supreme Court muddled Second Amendment jurisprudence
by finding a federal gun law constitutional based on the preservation of
the militia, the other branches of government were redefining the right
to bear arms according to their own visions of what the right meant.
Congress's interpretation of the Second Amendment, in the face of a
national crisis of crime and gun violence, along with pressure brought
to bear by the Roosevelt Administration, set the table for a modern
interpretation of the Second Amendment. This interpretation rested on a
valid balance between the right to bear arms and public safety.
Finally, in Section IV, I argue that, while the Heller Court was
correct to find the right to bear arms to be an individual right, the Court
should have given both greater latitude to legislatures when drafting gun
control legislation and more direction as to when a future gun law will
be declared unconstitutional. This would have been in keeping with the
original purpose of the Second Amendment.
II.

THE SECOND AMENDMENT PROBLEM

The Heller majority and dissenting opinions took very different
views of the nature of the Second Amendment and, in all likelihood,
have not settled the debate over the meaning of the Amendment.3 Justice
3

In fact, Professor Tushnet looks forward to the next Second Amendment case
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Scalia spends several pages on the history and background of the Second
Amendment, stretching from the British Bill of Rights through 20th
century American cases. This approach comports with his effort to
impose his brand of strict "originalism" on constitutional matters.4 Justice
Scalia's decision - while giving deference to British legal authorities, state
court judges, and 19th century legal scholars in order to explain how
informed people of the time understood their right to bear arms - spends
almost no time discussing what the drafters of the Second Amendment
sought to accomplish. Although I do not necessarily agree with Scalia's
wholesale rejection of a flexible or "living" Constitution, I will primarily
rely on originalist argument below. This will not, however, be a "new
originalist" argument. I reject the idea that all Americans had precisely
the same understanding of the right to bear arms, precluding what Scalia
seeks. In doing so, I will argue that the Second Amendment was not, as
Scalia argues, a time-honored right received from English jurisprudence,
but a practical fix to a defect in the Constitution. By understanding the
perceived problem and the compromise agreed to by Congress and the
states, we can better see the individual and state interests to be protected.
Justice Scalia considers the Second Amendment to be the
manifestation of a traditional and long-held English right. Scalia asserts
that the desirability of the Amendment was universally agreed to by the
colonists, and that the debate was simply as to whether it needed to be

4

when the composition of the Court will probably be different and perhaps
more sympathetic to the dissenter's position. Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun
Regulations After Heller: Speculations About Methods and Outcomes, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 1425, 1430 (2009).
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 38 (1997). To derive what the text meant, Scalia states that he gives
no greater weight to those who helped draft the constitutional provision than
what other "intelligent and informed people of the time" understood the
constitutional provision to mean. Id. Scalia derides most modern constitutional
interpretation which does not start with the text, but rather Supreme Court
cases, causing the issue to be decided according to the logic of the cases and not
the text or original understanding. Id. at 39. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Second
Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARv. L. REv. 246, 246
(2008) ("DistrictofColumbia v. Heller is the most explicitly and self-consciously
originalist opinion in the history of the Supreme Court."); Mark Tushnet,
Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609 (2008) (discussing the
"new originalism" of Scalia's opinion).
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codified in the Constitution. I For Scalia, the Second Amendment's
prefatory clause simply announces that the traditional right was codified
to prevent elimination of the militia, which was a major concern of the
Anti-Federalists. 6 Scalia argues that, after rejecting the Anti-Federalists'
revisions to restrict federal use of the militia, Congress adopted "the
popular and uncontroversial" amendments protecting "individual
rights."7 In fact, Scalia argues that self-defense and hunting may have
been more important to the colonists than preserving the militia.'
Like the constitutions of Pennsylvania, Vermont, North Carolina, and
Massachusetts, the Second Amendment protected gun rights independent
from military duty. 9 Even if the Amendment's language was unclear,
the state judiciaries and legal commentators soon held the right to be
expansive and held by individuals. 10
In contrast, Justice Stevens argued in his Heller dissent that, while
society in the 1790s valued an armed population, private ownership of
firearms was never considered an individual right." As Stevens' review of
5
6

7
8

9
10
11

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801.
Id. at 2801. Scalia asserts, however, that the Second Amendment guarantees
did not appease the Anti-Federalists. Id. at 2804 (citing, as an example,
Centinel, Revived, No. XXIX, INDEP. GAZETTER (Philadelphia), Sept. 9, 1789,
reprintedin THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 711, 712 (David E.
Young ed., 2d ed. 2001)).
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801.
Id. at 2802. To bolster his argument, Scalia cites the analogous arms-bearing
rights in state constitutions that preceded the Second Amendment. Id. at 2793
n.8.
Id. at 2802-03.

Id.
Id. at 2827. See also Brief of Amici Curiae Jack N. Rakove et al. In Support of
Petitioners at 2, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No.
07-290) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].

I cite to this brief repeatedly

throughout this section of the paper. I do this because the history behind the
Second Amendment has always been central to its understanding - including
Justice Scalia's opinion in Heller. This brief was prepared by 15 eminent
Historians, all of whom have written extensively on the colonial period and the
right to bear arms. I, like Justice Scalia, argue for a different reading of the
Second Amendment than the Historians. Still, I do not necessarily disagree
with the many historical facts that they offered to the Supreme Court. Since I
do not claim to be a professional historian, and was not interested in offering a
competing historical narrative, I rely heavily on their scholarship. Even with
these common points of historical reference, I argue that the right was meant
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the history of the Amendment shows, there was no single pre-constitutional
understanding of what a person's right to bear arms meant. 12 Rather than
protecting an established, individual right, the Amendment should be
read as determining the future status of the militia.13 As legal historians
pointed out in an amicus brief, the constitutional debate contained few
references to the private ownership of firearms, indicating that it was truly
a minor issue at the time.14 In addition, the state constitutions typically
only refer to the militia, with only a few specifically stating that arms may
be borne for the common defense.15
Many Americans were armed, and historians believe that arms
were easily obtained.16 If Americans felt that the Constitution threatened
private access to firearms, Anti-Federalists would have persistently leveled
that charge against the Constitution."17 Rather, the debate was always
about the militia and its public purposes, not about individual rights."
Both Scalia and Stevens's opinions are open to criticism, and
neither is a satisfactory explanation of the reasoning behind the Second
Amendment. First, Scalia's claim that the Second Amendment was a

12

13

14
15

16

17
18

to be individually-held, whereas the Historians argue for a communal right.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2831-36. Justice Stevens contends that the majority
opinion "gives short shrift to the drafting history of the Second Amendment."
Id. at 2836.
Id. at 2831 ("When each word in the text is given full effect, the Amendment
is most naturally read to secure to the people a right to use and posses arms in
conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia."). See also Brief of Amici
Curiae, supra note 11, at 24.
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 4.
Id. at 11 (citing N.C. CONST. of 1776 art. XVII, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 403 (William E Swindler ed.,
1978) ("for the defence of the State."); MASS. CONST. of 1780 pt. I, art. XVII,
reprintedin 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
95 (William E Swindler ed., 1975) ("for the common defence"); PA. CONST, Of
1776 art. XIII, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS 279 (William E Swindler ed., 1979) ("for the defence of
themselves and the state")).
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 35. The Historians do not take a
position on how well armed the Americans were at the time, but they assume
that "many Americans owned firearms and expected them to remain relatively
easy to obtain." Id.
Id.
Id.
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continuation of an understood English right is unpersuasive. The 1689
British right was vested in Parliament and not individuals,19 and was
only reserved to certain segments of the population, namely wealthy
Protestants.20 This understanding is held even by several of Scalia's
sources. 2 1 Also, the American experience was very different from British
needs. English gun regulations were intended to protect the aristocracy's
traditional privilege to hunt, an issue that American circumstances
rendered unnecessary. 22 Even more to the point, Americans on the frontier
facing threats of attack from animals, law-breakers, foreign powers, and
natives had to consider how to provide common defense differently from
those in England. These circumstances required a nearly universallyarmed population.23 If there was a commonly held conception of the
19
20

21

Id. at 2.
The 1671 Game Act restricted the poor from possessing firearms and other
hunting materials such as traps. See S. SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION,
97TH CONG., THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 3 (Comm. Print 1982).
The English Bill of Rights states, "That the subjects which are Protestant may
have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law."
Id. at 2 (citingJournalofthe House of Commons from Dec. 26, 1688 to Oct. 26,
1693, at 29 (London, 1742) and 1 Gul. and Mar. Sess., 2, c. 2 (1689)). After
adopting the Bill of Rights, Parliament reenacted the Game Act with the word
"guns" omitted from the list of items forbidden to the poor. Id. at 3 (citing
JOYCE MALCOLM, DISARMED: THE Loss OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMs IN
RESTORATION ENGLAND 16 (1980).
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2805-06 (2008)
(citing 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 143 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803)
("equated that right [arms right as necessary for self-defense], absent the
religious and class based restrictions, with the Second Amendment."); 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

22
23

§ 1891

(1833) (which points out that the right was held by Protestants only and that
"under various pretences the effect of this provision [in the English Bill of
Rights] has been greatly narrowed; and it is at present in England more nominal
than real, as a defensive privilege")).
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 12-13. In Britain, the game laws
sought to preserve the aristocracy's traditional hunting privileges. Id.
In fact, some colonies made provisions for providing firearms to the poor from
public funds for the purposes of arming militiamen. United States v. Miller,
307 U.S. 174, 181-82 (1939) (citing 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 12 (William Waller Hening ed.,
1823)). See also Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 11-12 (describing how
the lack of an organized militia in Pennsylvania for 20 years led to a provision
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right to arms, it would have been a truly American concept, and would
have had little to do with the English right.
Second, Congress could not have simply codified a traditional
right. By enumerating the right and giving a concept form with specific
words, the right was redefined. By phrasing an amendment in a particular
way, Congress allowed the people to understand their rights, and bound
future Congresses and courts when interpreting those rights.24 If the
First Congress had wished the right to be held universally, it could have
reserved the right to "all persons."25 If the Amendment was meant to
simply support the readiness of the country's military, it could have been
phrased "all citizens of military age." Rather, the First Congress chose
the politically-significant phrase, "The People," which indicates that it
was a political right held by those citizens eligible to vote.26 This group
is smaller than a universal definition in that it would exclude women,
children, and most non-whites. This group is also significantly larger than
potential militia members in that it would include white males over the
age of 40. Once words were agreed upon, different people's conceptions
of the pre-existing common law right would have to change, giving way
to a construction of the words that were now part of the Constitution.27

24

25

26
27

in the 1776 Constitution to require military service from every citizen to
protect the community from attacks by Native Americans and the British).
As St. George Tucker said in his commentary on the Bill of Rights, "A bill of
rights may be considered, not only as intended to give law, and assign limits to
a government about to be established, but as giving information to the people.
By reducing speculative truths to fundamental laws, every man of the meanest
capacity and understanding may learn his own rights, and know when they are
violated." 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 308 app. (St. George Tucker ed.,
1803).
In fact, the House Committee charged with revising Madison's draft bill of
rights used the phrase "composed of the body of the people" after militia. Brief
of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 28 (citing THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS
169-70 (Neil H. Cogan ed., Oxford University Press 1997)).
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

48-49 (1998).
I also would argue that different people in the colonial era must have had a
different understanding of gun ownership rights. It is hard to believe that even
in the 1790s, city dwellers and farmers had the same conception of the need for
firearms. In addition, those in Boston may have had a different understanding
from those in rural Virginia. See comments of Patrick Henry, infra note 46 and
accompanying text. See also District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,
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If arms were so broadly held and there was little talk, except by the
most frenzied Anti-Federalists, of the federal government's power to disarm
individuals, what need did the Second Amendment serve? Was it simply
an easily agreed-upon sop to the Anti-Federalists, as Scalia suggests?28 Was
it a restatement of the collective need for the militia, as Stevens claims?29J
instead argue that the Second Amendment was necessary to protect both
the rights of states and individuals in the face of a confusing new power
arrangement between the new federal and state governments.
The Constitution's drafters not only harbored a tremendous distrust
of standing armies, but also understood that the Articles of Confederation's
defense provisions were ineffective.30
In addition, Washington and
Hamilton had complained about the effectiveness of the state-controlled
militia and called for uniform training standards and membership limited
to a select body of young men instead of the larger mass of adult males.31
Although several delegates argued that the states would never give up their
traditional control over the militia, others such as Madison and General
Charles Pickney claimed that it was important to have "uniformity. . . in
the regulation of the Militia throughout the Union."32

28
29
30

31

32

2848-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing colonial era laws from Philadelphia,
New York, and Boston that restricted the firing of guns within city limits to
some degree). For example, Boston in 1746 had a law prohibiting the
"discharge" of "any Gun or Pistol charged with Shot or Ball in the Town." Id.
(citing Act of May 28, 1746, ch. 10).
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801.
Id. at 2822.
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 32-33. Under the Articles of
Confederation, Congress lacked the authority to lend additional support to the
Massachusetts government to put down the uprising. Id.
Id. at 14-15 (citing 26 GEORGE WASHINGTON, THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 389-90 (John
Fitzpatrick, ed. 1931-1944); 3 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Report on a Military
Peace Establishment, in THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 393-96 (Harold
C. Syrett, ed. 1962); Don Higginbotham, The FederalizedMilitia Debate: A
NeglectedAspect of SecondAmendment Scholarship, 55 Wm. & MARY Q. 39, 4044 (1998). Madison also pointed out that "The states neglect their militias
now," and would do no better after the Constitution gave the national
government greater resources for national defense. Brief ofAmici Curiae, supra
note 11, at 16 (citing James Madison, in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 384-88 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)).
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 15 (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
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The Constitution expressly allowed the federal government to
assume control of the militia in cases of national emergency. To ensure the
militia was worth controlling, Congress would also determine the various
militias' training and weaponry." As a check on the federal government's
power over the militia, the states would choose their militia's officers.14
Therefore, both levels of government would act directly on the citizens
comprising the militia." Exactly how this unusual arrangement would
work was unknown.36
The Federalist Papers argued for uniformity in organization and
that discipline was necessary to make the militia a viable alternative to a
standing army. The states would be protected by their ability to name
militia officers.38 Beyond that, the Federalists argued that this arrangement

34

1787, supra note 31, at 330-33).
See id. at 16. Rufus King stated that the new provisions of arming the militias
meant Congress could "provide for uniformity of arms, but included authority
to regulate the modes of furnishing [arms], either by the militia themselves, the
State Governments, or the National Treasury." Id. (citing THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 31, at 384-88). Madison seems to
have wanted to go even further, arguing that "the only effective militia would
be one ultimately controlled by Congress." Id. at 16.
Id. at 3 1.

35

Id.

36
37

Id. The Historians claim this would be a "political determination." Id.
THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton) ("This desirable uniformity can
only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction
of the national authority. . . . If a well-regulated militia be the most natural
defence of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at
the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of the national
security. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over
the militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is committed,
ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such
unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid of the
militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in support of the
civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different
kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to
the latter. To render an army unnecessary will be a more certain method of
preventing its existence than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.").
Id. ("If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any
conceivable establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of
the officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to extinguish
it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will always secure to them a

FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

33

38
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required a certain amount of trust in their fellow citizens that the militia
would not be abused. 3
The Federalists' arguments did not persuade everyone. Patrick
Henry declared that he was reluctant to surrender the militia, "this great
bulwark, this noble palladium of safety" and "most valuable of rights,"
to the federal government.40 The ratifying conventions produced several
multifaceted objections to the power-sharing arrangement between
federal and state governments over the militia.
First, the states and the people could either be actively disarmed
by the federal government, or passively disarmed through the willful
neglect of the militia. An armed population was the best protection for
a free people and would prevent the federal government from enforcing
oppressive laws.41 Delegates in Pennsylvania and North Carolina argued
that Congress could disarm the militia and thus put the population at risk.42
preponderating influence over the militia.").
Id. ("Where in the name of common-sense are our fears to end if we may not
trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow citizens? What shadow
of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their
countrymen and who participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments,
habits and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred
from a power in the Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to
command its services when necessary. . . ?").
40 The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RGHTS, supra
note 25, at 197 (citing 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 1, 378-88 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott 1888)) [hereinafter The Virginia Convention].
41 The Pennsylvania Convention Thursday 6 December 1787, THE COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 191 (citing 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 507, 508-09 (Merrill Jensen ed.,
Worzalla Publishing Co. 1976)) [hereinafter The Pennsylvania Convention].
Mr. Lenoir of North Carolina stated, "[Congress] can disarm the militia. If
they were armed, they would be a resource against the great oppressions. The
laws of a great empire are difficult to be executed. If the laws of the Union were
oppressive, they could not carry them into effect, if the people were possessed
of proper means of their defence." THE COMPLETE BILL OF RGHTS, supra note
25, at 191 (citing 4 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
203 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1888))
[hereinafter The North Carolina Convention].
42 The North Carolina Convention, supra note 41, at 191 (comments of Lenoir);
39
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More subtle than disarming the people outright, the federal government
could simply neglect the militia, not that the states had done such a
good job themselves. Recent experience had shown the militia not to
be the effective fighting force Washington wanted, and both Madison
and Henry agreed that their native Virginia had been unsuccessful in
arming its own militia. Still, Henry seemed to worry that the militia

43

The Pennsylvania Convention, supra note 41, at 191-92 (comments of John
Smilie).
Mason recalled a situation 40 years before when a governor of Pennsylvania
suggested to the British Parliament that the best way to weaken the colonists was
to disuse and neglect the militia. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Jonathan

44

45

Eliot ed., 2d ed., New York 1888), reprintedin THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 25, at 192-99 (Comments of Mason and Henry).
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 11-12 (citing Nathan Kozuskanich,
Defending Themselves: The Original Understandingof the Right to Bear Arms, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 1041, 1044-46 (2007)). The Historians do offer an interesting
insight into the Pennsylvania situation. Id. Starting in the 1750s an impasse
between the proprietary governor and the assembly, combined with the influence
of Quaker pacifism, effectively prevented the colonial government from
maintaining a militia. Id. at 11. During the Indian attacks of the 1760s the
residents of frontier counties petitioned the provincial government to organize
the militia and provide the resources necessary to sustain it. Id. Pennsylvania
failed to organize the militia right up to 1776 when it did not even respond to
the British threat. Id. at 11-12. As a result, the common defense was provided
by voluntary militia units, and committees arose to demand a new constitution
that would coerce military service from every citizen. Id. at 12. The Historians
claim, therefore, that the phrase "for the defense of themselves" does not refer to
an individual right, but to the community's capacity to protect itself from the
threats posed by either Native Americans or the British army. Id.
Having commanded the militias during the Revolution, Washington wanted
not only uniform standards of training for the various state militias, but argued
that the militias could only be effective if "formed from a select body of young
men, as opposed to the larger mass of adult males legally eligible for service."
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 14-15 (citing 26 WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 389-90 (John Fitzpatrick ed., 1931-1944)); Madison argued,
"Have we not found, from experience, that, while the power of arming and
governing the militia has been solely vested in state legislatures, they were
neglected and rendered unfit for immediate service? Every state neglected too
much this most essential object." The Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at
195. Henry stated, "though our Assembly has, by a succession of laws for many
years, endevoured to have the militia completely armed, it is still far from being
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would not be poorly armed out of maliciousness, but out of a lack of
understanding. Would the members of Congress from New Hampshire
know which arms the militia in Virginia needed?46 In fact, Virginia's own
militia law allowed different populations to be armed differently47 Could
or would the federal government be able to make such subtle distinctions
to address local needs, or would the need for national uniformity in arms
and training take precedent? In effect, the militia could be armed, but
not in a way that benefited the individual, locality, or state.4 1
Madison claimed that the power to arm the militia would
Henry
be concurrent between the states and federal government."4
disagreed.o The Constitution clearly gave the power to arm to the federal
government and not to the states.51 Even if the power was concurrent,
Henry asked, would militiamen have to pay for double sets of arms at
very great cost?52 To address this problem, Mason and Henry offered
46

47

48

49

50
51
52

the case." Id. at 198.
The Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 199 (Henry stating, "If Congress are
to arm us exclusively, the man of New Hampshire may vote for or against it, as
well as the Virginian. The great distance and difference between the two places
render it impossible that the people of that country can know or pursue what
will promote our convenience.").
The Virginia Militia Law allowed the militia of the western counties to arm
themselves with rifles rather than muskets, "Provided, That the militia of the
counties westward of the Blue Ridge, and the counties below adjoining thereto,
shall not be obliged to be armed with muskets, but may have good rifles with
proper accoutrements, in lieu thereof." United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174,
182 (1939) (citing THE STATUTES AT LARGE, BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 23).
The Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 199. This potential reliance on
people who did not understand local needs seemed to be an important point for
Henry. Id. (Henry stating that, "If you have given up your militia, and Congress
shall refuse to arm them, you have lost everything. Your existence will be
precarious, because you depend on others, whose interests are not affected by
your infelicity.").
Id. at 195 (Madison stated, "I cannot conceive that this Constitution, by giving
the general government the power of arming the militia, takes it away from the
state governments. The power is concurrent, and not exclusive.").
Id. at 196-99.
Id. at 197; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
The Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 198 (Henry argued, "May we not
discipline and arm them, as well as Congress, if the power be concurrent? so that
our militia shall have two sets of arms, double sets of regimentals, &c.; and thus,
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potential amendments.,, Mason wanted a provision stating that if the
federal government did not arm and train the militia, the states should be
allowed to do so. 54 Henry went even further, saying that Congress should
not have the power to arm or discipline the militia until the states have
refused or neglected to do so. 55
Second, a persistent concern was that oppressions would
follow if the federal government took a militia away from its home
state for lengthy periods.56 As William Findley argued before the
Pennsylvania convention, "[t] he militia will be taken from home; and
when the militia of one state has quelled insurrections and destroyed the
liberties, the militia of the last state may, at another time, be employed
in retaliation of the first."57 Even if the citizens of other states were
not abused, there were other considerations. By taking the militia to
fight for the federal government, the states would lose their means of
self-defense.58 Individuals would also be at risk. Long-term service
could be so burdensome that people might vote to abolish the militia
and establish a standing army. It also could lead to the imposition of
the harsh martial law typical of standing armies, but not of militias
- another reason to eliminate the militia.59
To address these issues,

53
54

55
56

57
58

59

at very great cost, we shall be doubly armed. The great object is, that every man
be armed. But can the people afford to pay for double sets of arms &c.?").
Id. at 194, 198.
Id. at 194 (Mason stated, "I wish that, in case the general government should
neglect to arm and discipline the militia, there should be an express declaration
that the state governments might arm and discipline them.").
Id. at 198.
The Pennsylvania Convention, supra note 41, at 191 (John Smilie stating, "[The
militia] may [be] dragged from one state to any other"); The Virginia Convention,
supra note 40, at 192-94 (George Mason suggested that "[i]t would be to use the
militia to a very bad purpose, if any disturbance happened in New Hampshire,
to call [the militia] from Georgia," with the potential for one state's troops to be
used to oppress the rights and liberties of another state.).
The Pennsylvania Convention, supra note 41, at 192 (comments of William
Findley).
The Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 192-94 (Mason commenting that
taking the militia was "extremely unsafe" in that it would "take from the state
legislatures what divine Providence has given to every individual - the means of
self defence").

The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constition (Jonathan Eliot ed., 2d ed., New York 1888), reprinted in THE
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Mason proposed that the federal government could not send a state's
militia beyond the limits of an adjoining state without the consent of
the appropriate state legislature. In response, Madison claimed that
the idea that a state militia would be dragged across the continent was
"preposterous" and that the popularly elected portion of Congress
would prevent the federal government from abusing its powers.60
Third, it was noted that the Constitution did not protect
conscientious objectors from military service.6 1 This was an especially
important issue in states such as Pennsylvania, where a large portion of the
population were Quakers who were theologically opposed to performing
military service. Such a provision would be a more traditional right to
protect a minority against government power.
Fourth, there was a concern that the militia would be used to
replace the traditional civil law enforcement authorities. If the federal
government wanted to enforce its law, it seemingly had to rely on
the state militias to do so. 62 At the time, most law enforcement was
supra note 25, at 192-94 (Comments of Mason);
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, Vol. 2 (Merrill
Jensen ed., Madison, Wis., 1976-1978), reprintedin THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 191-192 (comments of Smilie). See The Pennsylvania
Convention, supra note 41, at 191-92 (Smilie worrying that federal military law
would not be as "mild" as the state laws allowing "[m] ilitia men may be punished
with whipping or death"); The Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 192-94
(Mason arguing that such conditions would also harass and weaken the militia
and bring about a standing army, and suggesting that the militia should not be
subjected to martial law except in time of war); id. at 194 (Madison dismissing
the notion that martial law would be established in peacetime by stating that the
states will have control over the militia when not in service to the Union).
The Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 195-96 ("Would the legislature of
the state drag the militia of the eastern shore to the western frontiers, or those of
the western frontiers to the eastern shore, if the local militia were sufficient to
effect the intended purpose? There is something so preposterous, and so full of
mischief, in the idea of dragging the militia unnecessarily from one end of the
continent to the other, that I can think there can be no ground of apprehension.").
The Pennsylvania Convention, supra note 41, at 192 (comments of Findley).
The Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 192-200 (comments of Madison,
Clay, and Henry); The Pennsylvania Convention, supra note 41, at 191-92
(Smilie arguing that the proposed federal government could not be a free one
because it was to rule by power of the purse and sword rather than relying on the
"confidence of the people"). This is, of course, a gross overstatement - any
government needs to enforce its rule by some means beyond the unanimous
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,

60

61
62
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conducted by the posse comitatus, which was operated by the local sheriff
and had a county-wide jurisdiction.63 State-wide law enforcement may
have required the governor to call upon the militia. The composition
of the local posse and state militia were similar, and both had the
considerable benefit of allowing the community or state to respond to
threats without relying on professional military personnel.
In some
ways, the militia was a subset of "the people" in that it included voters
who were "able-bodied," and excluded older voters; however, it also
included people who were not yet old enough to vote. The posse could
potentially be much larger than the pool of voters, and was certainly
larger than the potential militia.

63

consent of the people.
Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law
Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 383, 389-92 (2003). "Posse comitatus"
means "force of the county" and referred to the common law power of a sheriff
to summon able bodied persons to assist him in keeping the peace, pursuing and
arresting felons and suppressing riots. Eligibility for a posse differed from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a posse as
men over the age of 15 years exclusive of peers, clergymen, and infirm persons.
12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 171 (2d ed. 1989). Blackstone claimed the
sheriff may command all the people of his county. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *86.

64

See David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots and the Revolution: The Law and History of
Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IowA L. RvEV. 1, 26-27 (1971) (noting
tremendous difference in the British and American posse, whereas military
personnel were eligible to assist law enforcement in Britain, there has been a
strong American tradition of severely limiting the use of the military when
enforcing laws); Kealy, supra note 63, at 389.
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Entity

"The People"

Posse Comitatus

State Militia

Federal Militia

Members

Massachusetts:
men over the

Able-bodied
men over the age

Massachusetts
(1784): able-

Militia Act of
1792: free, able-

age of 21 with a
freehold estate

of 15 years.

bodied men
between the ages

bodied, white
male citizens

of 16 and 40;

between the ages

an annual income
of 3 pounds, or a

Virginia(1785):
all "free males"

with congressmen, stagecoach

value of 60 pounds
(Massachusetts
Constitution,

between the ages
of 18 and 50.

drivers, and
ferryboatmen
exempted.

within the Com-

monwealth, with

1

1_____
1780)._1_

______

of 18 and 45,

1_

1

_1

At Virginia's ratifying convention, Clay worried that the militia
may be sent to the Mississippi, and that using the militia to enforce the
laws would lead to a military government.6 5 He asked why this mode
was preferable to the traditional practice of the local sheriff raising a
posse comitatus to enforce the laws.66 Madison responded that the posse
comitatus may not be sufficient to enforce the law, since it only covered
a county.6 7 In such instances, the militia would be used, but "when the
civil power was sufficient, this mode would never be put in practice."68
Ultimately, Madison argued that this was preferable to using a standing
army to enforce the law. Once again, Henry stated that Madison was
too trusting of Congress and federal officers, and argued that the military
power ought not to interpose until the civil power refused to act. 6 9
Under the Constitution, the states retained the police power that
gave them broad and exclusive legislative authority to regulate most facets
of daily life, including property, criminal law, health, and welfare.70 This
65

The Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 196.

66
67

Id.
Id.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 196-99.

70

Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 3, 14. For example, the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights of 1776 affirmed that "the people of this State have the
sole, exclusive and inherent right of governing and regulating the internal police
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aspect of federalism makes Clay and Henry's law enforcement-oriented
objection to the new power-sharing arrangement over the militia essential
to understanding the need for the Second Amendment. Although the
Second Amendment mentions the militia, that was not the only entity
that needed protection. As stated above, the militia and the posse comitatus
were drawn generally from the same group of people. Armed males acting
in concert with others from the county formed the posse; those acting
under state-wide authority formed the traditional militia; those militias
combined with other militias under federal authority formed an army.
The armed individuals were the common building blocks for what could
generally be termed the "common defense."
Federal use of the militia to enforce laws created particular
problems for three groups: the population that was not complying with the
federal law, the militia men who were deployed, and the population from
which the militia had been drawn. First, it may be ridiculous to think, as
Smilie did, that the federal government did not need some enforcement
mechanism. Still, if the federal laws are reasonable and acceptable to the
large majority of people, shouldn't the traditional posse be enough to
enforce the law? Second, what would the effect on militia men be over
a long period of time as they enforced the law on their fellow citizens?
Third, what would happen to the communities and states from which
those militia men were drawn? Since the men who made up the militia
also made up a large portion of the posse comitatus, who would be left
to provide local protection? They would be, as Mason pointed out, left
without the means of self-defense at the local and state levels. This may
have been the reasoning behind this draft amendment offered by some
Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists: "[T]he people have a right to bear arms for
the defense of themselves and their own State, or the United States, or for
the purpose of killing game. . . ."72 How individuals, localities, and states
would enforce the law when the militia was called away on federal duty is
important for understanding the need for the Second Amendment.
The final Amendment did not expressly prevent Congress from
disarming the people as some of the proposed amendments did, 7 thus
71
72
73

of the same."
The Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 192-94.
EDWARD DUMBAULD,

THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY

(1957).
The Historians cite New Hampshire's recommended

174

12th Amendment:
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undermining an "insurrectionist" reading of the Second Amendment allowing the right of popular resistance to tyrannical government.74 Nor
did the final Amendment protect conscientious objectors. 7 Still, I would
argue that the spare language of the Second Amendment addressed several
of the Anti-Federalists' concerns.

"Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have been in
Actual Rebellion." Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 22 (citing THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 181).
The Massachusetts
convention rejected a provision saying "that the said Constitution be never
construed to authorize Congress. . . to prevent the people of the United States,
who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms." Id. (citing 6 THE
DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY

OF THE

RATIFICATION

OF THE

CONSTITUTION,

RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: MASSACHUSETTS

1453,

1469-1471 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., State 2000)). The
Pennsylvania anti-federalists published the following in their Dissent: "7. That
the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own
state, [sic] or for the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for
disarming the people or any of them, unless the crimes committed, or real
danger of public injury from individuals." Id. at 23 (citing 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION OF THE

74

75

CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: PENNSYLVANIA 597-98 (Merrill Jensen ed.,
Worzalla Publishing Co. 1976)).
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 32-33. Given that the Constitution was
written with Shay's Rebellion in mind and specifically allows the militia to be
called out to put down insurrections, this argument should be rejected. Even
more radical Anti-Federalist language that would specifically prevent Congress
from disarming citizens did not protect insurrectionists.
Id. at 27-28. The provision was suggested by the Maryland convention and
made it into Madison's original draft. Id. (citing THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 181). This clause was the sole subject of debate in the
House. In all likelihood, the Congress did not want to unnecessarily hamper the
states or future Congresses in determining the composition of the militia. Such
provisions were already found in the constitutions of Pennsylvania (PA. CONST.
of 1776, ch. I, § VIII; "Nor can any man who is conscientiously scrupulous of
bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, if he will pay such equivalent;") New
York (N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XL; "That all such of the Inhabitants of this
State, being of the people called Quakers, as from Scruples of Conscience may
be averse to the bearing of Arms, be there from excused by the Legislature;");
and New Hampshire (N.H. CONST. of 1783, pt. I, art. XIII; "No person who is
conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness of bearing arms, shall be
compelled thereto, provided he will pay an equivalent.").
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First, the prefatory clause puts a new federal obligation in place
to go along with its rights to arm and train. Rather than simply restating
the republican truism that the militias were both necessary and superior
to standing armies, the prefatory clause could be read to provide some
protection against the Anti-Federalists' concerns. With one phrase "a well regulated militia" - Madison not only reasserted the Federalist
desire for a better, federally-controlled militia,76 but he provided some
protection to the states. The phrase could also be read to mean that,
not only does Congress have the power to train and equip the militias,
it now has a constitutional obligation to do so. A militia that could
be systematically disarmed, neglected, armed without thought to local
circumstances, or subjected to harsh martial law could not be considered
"well-regulated."
The Amendment also protects an individual's right to arms to
provide for personal protection and common defense. The strange
thing about the right to bear arms is that, at the time the Bill of Rights
was drafted, it would not have been considered a counter-majoritarian
interest as it may be considered now.77 Gun ownership was common
and citizens were expected to use those guns for the common defense.78
76

77

78

Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 32-33 (the Historians point out that the
people's aversion to serving in "a well-regulated" militia outweighed the
Federalist's efforts to turn the militia into a more effective military operation).
Id. at 5-13. The Historians in their brief stated that although there are no
statistics, in the early days of the nation firearms were expected to be readily
available. By 2004, the National Firearm Survey found that only 38 percent of
households and 26 percent of individuals reported owning at least one firearm.
This survey was conducted by researchers from the Harvard School of Public
Health to determine the number of privately-held firearms in the United States.
The survey comprised the responses of 2,770 adults over the age of 18 living in
the United States during the spring of 2004. L. Hepburn et al., The US Gun
Stock: Results from the 2004 National Firearm Survey, 13 INJ. PREVENTION 15,
15-19 (2007), availableat http://injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/13/1/15.
full.
See James Lindgren & Justin L. Heather, Counting Guns in Early America, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1777, 1780 (2002) (a review of early American probate
records show a high rate of gun ownership ranging from 54-73 percent).
Machiavelli and other republican theorists treated the obligation to bear arms in
defense of one's country as one of the rights and privileges that distinguished
citizens from subjects. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 18. The
Historians state in a footnote that this point merits far more development than
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In fact, Congress chose to strike the only truly counter-majoritarian
provision of Madison's original Amendment - to protect conscientious
objectors.7 Firearms were widely held to protect personal property, to
obtain food, and to collectively protect the community. 0 Why was there
little talk about specifically protecting a private right to arms?" There was
no need to talk about the right of gun ownership because it was simply
assumed for the vast majority of residents. What was instead at issue was
the obligation of an individual to produce and use the weapon for the
common defense. Until 1789, the common defense relied upon a series
of obligations starting with the individual to his locality, the locality to
the county, and the county to the state. The Constitution added a new
layer of obligations and gave some of the states' traditional rights to the
new federal government.

79

80

81

it can receive here, because it illustrates how republican thinking conceived of
rights not solely as something to be protected against abuse by the state, but in
the very different language of the civic duties of citizens. Id. at 18-19 n.4.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. II and Madison's original proposal from June 8,
1789: "Fourthly. That in article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4 [of the
Constitution], be inserted these clauses, to wit, ... The right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated
militia being the best security of a free country: but no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in
person." Congressional Register, June 8, 1789, vol. 1, p. 427, reprintedin THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 169.
In fact, there were several state statutes that demanded that inhabitants of the
newly organized states own, maintain, and, when required, bear a weapon for
the common defense.
See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 22 (contending that few AntiFederalist arguments for a private right to arms garnered much political support).
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Actor

Rights

Responsibilities

Federal

* Prescribe militia arms
and training.
* Federalize militia when

* Organize national common defense.
* Provide for well-regulat-

needed.

ed militia.

State

* Appoint militia officers.
* Use militia when not in
federal service.
* Population will not be
disarmed by federal government.

* Organize state common
defense.
* Support federal common
defense.
* Provide for well-regulated militia.
* Provide reasonable restrictions (police powers).

Local

* Population will not be
disarmed by either state or
federal government.

* Organize local common
defense.
* Support state common
defense.

People

* Keep and bear arms.

* Obey reasonable state
regulations imposed
through police power.
* Provide for the common
defense:
1. Participate in militia:
a. Possess required weapons;
b. Muster for training.
2. Participate in posse
comitatus.

An individual's right to bear arms may not have been discussed
at length, but the obligation of providing for a common defense was.
Given this new arrangement, the rights that needed immediate protection
were those of the localities and states that would continue to rely on an
armed citizenry for protection. Madison may have been protecting the
Federalist's vision of congressional authority over the organization of the
militia, 82 but at the same time, I would argue, he was addressing the serious
questions that arose due to this power-shift over the militia. Would the
82

Id. at 28-30.
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federal government mandate that individuals would only be armed when
in federal service? Would the weapons needed in a federal army be useful
to the locality's needs? Would only those select people eligible for militia
duty be allowed arms? If so, what would happen while they were away
from the locality or the state? As Mason asked, how would the state
defend itself, not just from external threat, but to enforce the law if the
militia was deployed elsewhere?83
The Second Amendment's reference to two groups, "The People"
and "the militia," could cause "grammatical and analytical tension"
between the Amendment's two clauses. 84 Professor Amar resolves this
tension by reading the two terms as synonymous." As used in the
Constitution, "The People" referred to voters, "the same adult male
citizens who, roughly speaking, constituted the militia."16 Scalia also
seems to read the clause "the people" as synonymous with "the militia,"
in that the latter was broadly composed of all "able-bodied men."17 I
83
84

The Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 192-94 (comments of Mason).
AMAR, supra note 26, at 216. Amar points out that the original Amendment
passed by the House read "Awell regulated militia, composed of the body of the
people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the People to keep and
bear arms, shall not be infringed. . . ." The Senate created the tension with what
Amar terms a "stylistic" change. The Historians claim that this change moved
"the people" vested with the right closer to the republican ideal of the adult male
citizenry, and that Senate Federalists believed such a broad phrase would not
hinder Congress in using its best judgment as to how the militia should be
organized, armed, and disciplined. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 28,
29 (citing THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 169-70). Some
commentators claim this was sloppy editing and did not change the Amendment's
meaning. Id. at 29 (citing JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMs: THE
ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT

85

86

87

161 (1994)).

AMAR, supra note 26, at 51-52 ("the militia" is identical to "the people"). Amar
also quotes Tench Coxe from a 1788 essay, "Who are the militia, Are they not
ourselves?" Id. at 52, 216.
Id. at 245. Besides the Preamble to the Constitution, the phrase "The People"
appears just once and clearly referred to voters: "The House of Representatives
shall be. . . chosen every second Year by the People of the several States." Id. at
49. The right to bear arms, therefore, would be similar to other rights reserved
to voters such as holding office and serving on a jury. Id. at 48-49. Amar states
that he does not deny that "The People" could be read more broadly, but he
simply seeks to emphasize the structural and populist core of the right. Id. at 49.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2800 (2008) (Scalia writes that
the Second Amendment gives Congress the power to organize an existing entity,
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contend that rather than being analogous, the militia is a subset of the
people, and the tension is there purposefully.," By guaranteeing the right
to keep and bear arms to a larger group of people than were eligible for
militia service, the state would always have a segment of the population
armed and available to provide for the common defense. By guaranteeing
the right to the people, neither the state (with its police powers)89 nor the
federal government (with its power over the militia) could disarm the
people at the expense of the other. Furthermore, by placing the right
with the individual, that person is ensured the ability to protect himself
and his property even when civil law enforcement is at its weakest due
to an emergency in another part of the state or on the other side of the
continent - a clear concern of some Anti-Federalists.
On that last point, some could argue that protecting one's self
and property is not, strictly speaking, common defense. Still, with no
organized police force, someone had to address the immediate threat
of crime and deter criminal activity.90 An armed population does that.
Even if it does not qualify as "common defense," we must bear in mind
that Congress had the opportunity to limit the scope of the Second
Amendment to "keep and bear arms for the common defense" but chose
not to do so. 91
88
89

90

91

"the militia," which was commonly defined as including "all able-bodied men").
See, e.g., supra p. 240.
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 25-26. The Historians argue that
Madison worded the Bill of Rights in such a way so the states would retain their
traditional police powers, including the right to regulate firearms. Id. The
Historians point out that Madison himself had introduced a bill originally
drafted by Jefferson, to prohibit hunters who had violated the ban on deer
hunting from the "bearing of a gun [not arms]" beyond their own lands. Id. at
26 n.6 (quoting and citing 2 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON 443-44 (Julian Boyd ed.,
1950)).
As Montesquieu wrote in the Spirit of the Laws, "In the case of natural defence
I have a right to kill, because my life is in respect to me what the life of my
antagonist is to him .... With individuals the right of natural defence does not
imply a necessity of attacking. Instead of attacking they need only have recourse
to proper tribunals. They cannot therefore exercise this right of defence but in
sudden cases, when immediate death would be the consequence of waiting for
the assistance of the law."
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 29-30 (citing THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 174-75) (the Senate too considered and rejected this
change). Some have argued, as I do, that this indicates a right to use weapons
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The obligation of providing the common defense was premised
upon, at its core, an individual's right to have arms. During the 19th
century and into the 20th century, the methods for providing the common
defense changed dramatically. The obligation to provide for the common
defense may not have dissolved completely, but all that remains today in
most places is the need to protect one's own person and household. That
does not mean, however, that the core right is lost. Whatever the common
law right to arms was in England or colonial America is immaterial. The
Amendment, which specifically protects the gun rights of a group larger
than any level of government required to provide the common defense
demonstrates that there is an individual right to bear arms.
Of course, although the states would retain the ability to reasonably
regulate firearms through the police powers, "[n] ot even the most paranoid
Anti-Federalist imagined that the national government would have the
incentive or means to interfere with this traditional form of regulation."92
Given this analysis, the states could not completely disarm the people per
this agreement between federal and state governments.
III.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT

This matrix of responsibilities and rights suited the new republic.
It was flexible, providing protection against many different types of
threats, and avoided the specter of a liberty-destroying standing army.
Still, the needs of the various states and the nation as a whole have changed
dramatically over time. First, since the Civil War, the construction of "the
people" has been expanded to include all people in the United States, not
just the segment of the population that had the right to vote. The right
has thus transformed from a political right to a civil right. Second, in the
20th century, the militia consisting of most of the adult male population
for other lawful purposes. See Nelson Lund, The Pastand Futureofthe Individual'

92

Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REv. 1, 35 (1996). In contrast, the Historians argue
that other possible reasons are more compelling - that the phrase was superfluous
and redundant to the militia's purpose, and that such a qualification could
restrict the federal uses of the militia in Article I, such as the suppression of
insurrections. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 30.
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 31-32. The regulation of firearms at this
time may have been lax, but it did exist. Id. at 31. For example, states and
localities regulated the private keeping of gun powder and the public carrying of
weapons. Id.
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exists on paper, but is not relied upon for defense of the state or nation.
Professional military and law enforcement operations have replaced the
need for calling on an armed population to provide the common defense.
Greater emphasis is now placed on and individual's right to self-protection
rather than the protection of the community. This section will examine
some of these changes.
As stated above, "the people" referred to a political right held
by those who were eligible to vote - essentially, free, white, adult men.
During Reconstruction, this changed dramatically, and arms-bearing
evolved from a political right into a civil right. During Reconstruction,
the southern states passed laws making it illegal for the newly-freed African
Americans to exercise basic civil rights, including the right to purchase,
possess, and use firearms.93 In addition, various militias operating in the
South at this time terrorized the black population, invading homes and
seizing property, including firearms. 9 As a response, Reconstruction
republicans recast the right to bear arms as a civil right. The right to bear
arms was not reserved to those who had an obligation to participate in
the militia to protect the state or nation, but was held by everyone for the
purpose of self-protection." The "militia" was no longer associated with
arms-bearing:
Creation-era arms bearing was collective, exercised in a
well regulated militia embodying a republican right of
the people, collectively understood.
Reconstruction
gun-toting was individualistic, accentuating not group
rights of the citizenry but self regarding "privileges"
of discrete "citizens" to individual self protection. The
Creation vision was public, with the militia muster
on the town square. The Reconstruction vision was
private, with individual freedmen keeping guns at

93

94

95

Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: Declarationsby
a Co-Equal Branch on the IndividualRight to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L.
REv. 597, 598 (1995).
See AMAR, supra note 26, at 258 (citing HARPER'S WEEKLY, Jan. 13, 1866 at 3,
col. 2 ("The militia of [Mississippi] have seized every gun and pistol found in the
hands of the (so-called) freedmen")).
Id. at 258-59.
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home to ward off Klansmen and other ruffians.96
The Reconstruction-era Congress recast the operative clause from
a right of the people to an individualistic privilege of persons.97 This is
evident in the Freedman's Bureau Act of 1866, which Congress passed
over the veto of President Johnson. This law stated:
the right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all laws

and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal
security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition
of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional
right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all
citizens of such State or district without respect to race or
color or previous condition of slavery.98
The same Congress adopted the 14th Amendment, which
provides, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life liberty, or property, without due process of
law ... ." The core purpose of the 14th Amendment and the Freedman's
Bureau Act was to outlaw the Black Codes of the South and affirm the
right of every citizen to self-defense.1oo One of the "personal rights" the
14th Amendment was intended to protect from state infringement was
the right to keep and bear arms.10 1 As Senator Samuel Pomeroy stated,
96
97
98

Id. at 259.
Id.

Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173, 176-77 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)).
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
100 See AMAR, supra note 26, at 264.
101 See AMAR, supra note 26, at 264-65 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
474 (1866) (statements of Lyman Trumbull) (arguing against a Mississippi law
that prohibited "any negro or mulatto from having fire-arms" and associated gun
ownership with Blackstone's "Absolute Rights of Individuals"); CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 651 (1866) (statements of Representative Josiah Grinnell)
(arguing against the Kentucky law preventing blacks from keeping or buying a
gun - even "a musket which he has carried through the war"); CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1073 (1866) (statement of Senator James Nye) ("as citizens
of the United States they have equal right to protection, and to keep and bear
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"Every man . . . should have the right to bear arms for the defense of
himself and his family and his homestead. And if the cabin door of the
freedman is broken open and the intruder enters for purposes as vile as
were known to slavery, then should a well-loaded musket be in the hand
of the occupant .. ."102 Amar points out the threat of this period was
not a federal standing army, but state encroachment on basic civil rights,
and the issue focused on private violence and local lapses in protection
rather than federal tyranny.103 If the Second Amendment ever stood
for a collective right, the Reconstruction period interpretation, and the
purpose behind the 14th Amendment, was clearly individualistic.104
The drafters of the 14th Amendment interpreted the Second
Amendment differently than the Founding generation. In 1789, the
Second Amendment protected the political right of keeping and bearing
arms for "The People" - understood at the time to be the polity of
adult, white, male voters from which the militia was drawn. The 14th
Amendment treats firearms as an individually-held civil right. Amar
claims that where the Second Amendment fused together arms-bearing,
military service, and political representation, the 14th Amendment pulls
them apart and places arms-bearing at a different level than voting or
militia service.105 The drafters of the 14th Amendment consistently
claimed that the Amendment and the Civil Rights Act were focused on
"civil rights" and not "political rights" like voting. The right to keep and
bear arms would be extended, but suffrage would not be extended to
women and minors.106

IV. A

20TH CENTURY INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT

By the third decade of the 20th century, American society had
changed dramatically from the one known by the First Congress. The
arms for self-defense")).
102 See AMAR, supra note 26, at 265 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1182 (1866)).

103 Id. at 266.
104 Id. at 261-62 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *141-44) (there
was much reference during this era to Blackstone, who affirmed the right to
"have arms" to protect the primary rights of personal security, personal liberty,
and private property, and the ultimate individual right of "self preservation").
105 Id. at 217-18.
106 Id. at 216-17.
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nation had a very different military and law enforcement structure that,
in most instances, no longer depended upon an armed citizenry. The
1930s also brought a dramatic and frighteningly dangerous new type of
criminal - the powerfully armed and highly mobile gangster. Addressing
this crime wave gave the President an opportunity to propose sweeping
gun legislation for the first time. Congress, which had been compliant
with the President on crime policy, produced a law far more limited than
the President wanted. The congressional debate shows that the Congress
was wary of overstepping its constitutional authority to restrict gun
ownership.
Still, where should the line be drawn? There were no judicial
precedents to rely on, and the representatives were very aware that they
faced a threat very different from anything the Founders faced. Many
reasons were offered both for protecting and severely restricting an
individual's right to keep and bear arms. Although Congress saw that it
had the constitutional authority to create sweeping federal gun laws and
severely restrict the availability of handguns, it refused to do so. Instead,
Congress decided to address the crime crisis in the least restrictive way
possible. Congressional restraint was based on the same federalism theory
that inspired the Second Amendment. Even though society had changed,
Congress believed that decisions affecting gun ownership should not
be made at the national level, but should instead be left to the states,
municipalities, and personal judgment. Congress found some vitality
left in the Second Amendment: although its protections would not be
as far-reaching, the core rationale for the Amendment remained, and
it protected the individual gun owner from total prohibitions on gun
ownership, at least by the federal government.
This law also gave the Supreme Court its first opportunity to
interpret the Second Amendment in the Miller case. The Court's Miller
decision offered a muddled interpretation based on a theory of preserving
the militia. In contrast, Congress offered a clear precedent based on
respect for individual rights and how those rights fit into the modern
world. The Heller Court would have done better to ignore the Miller
decision and focus instead on Congress's creation of the law that was the
foundation of that case. This section will examine this fascinating and
overlooked interpretation.
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The NationalFirearmsAct

From the mid 1920s through the 1930s, there was a tremendous
increase in crime, with great attention paid to kidnapping, auto theft, and
bank robbery,107 especially in the area of the mid and southwestern states,
referred to as some as the "Crime Corridor."o8 Although bank robberies
had started to subside in the early 1930s, the threat continued to grip the
nation, largely due to the attention given to several high profile criminals
such as Al Capone, George "Machine Gun" Kelly, Clyde Barrow, Bonnie
Parker, and John Dillinger.o9 After the sensational 1932 Lindberg baby
kidnapping, there was a wave of well-publicized kidnappings.110
While the federal government increased its participation in
fighting crime,"' citizens began to arm themselves. Celebrities such as
Marlene Dietrich, Norma Shearer, and Gloria Swanson hired security
services to protect their children, and some Hollywood mothers were
reported as arming their chauffeurs and gardeners.112 To address bandits,
some bankers' associations were recruiting and arming "bank guards"

107

CLAIRE BOND POTTER, WAR ON CRIME: GANGSTERS, G-MEN, AND THE POLITICS

124 (1998). In January, 1934, J. Edgar Hoover used
statistics culled from his Uniform Crime Reports to show Congress that there
had been a rise in felonious homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
larceny, and auto theft. Id. at 124.
Id. at 65, 67, 69. In the tri-state area of Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma at least
one bank raid occurred every week during 1930. Id. at 67. Between 1920 and
1930, The New York Times reported on 43 major bank robberies in the crime
corridor states of Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas, Missouri, and Indiana, and
published editorials calling for federal action against these armed bandits. Id. at
69.
Id. at 136-38. By 1933, the State of Indiana had requested federal help in
tracking down Dillinger and his gang, and the FBI conducted the manhunt
during the spring and summer of 1934. Id. at 138.
Id. at 108-09 (discussing 27 major kidnappings in 1933, many of which were
unsolved during the first half of 1934).
Id. at 109. The Roosevelt Administration responded to the threat of bank
robberies and kidnappings by authorizing its Justice Department and J. Edgar
Hoover's growing Division of Investigation to "spend as much money as ...
necessary" to end the crime wave. Id. (quoting WASHINGTON MIRROR, Aug. 1,
1933).
Id. at 108 (citing N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1933; TIME, July, 24, 1933).
OF MASS CULTURE 62-67,

108

109

110
111

112
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with powerful but concealable weapons."' During the 1930s, members
of the public had armed themselves and, in some instances, were ready to
fight bank robbers:
One hot August day in Kansas City, Kansas, a bandit
walked up to a teller and ordered him to place one hand
on his head and put money up on the counter with the
other. The teller fired a gas gun kept in the cash drawer:
subsequently, a bank vice president charged out ofhis office
firing a pistol; and finally, the bandit and his gang were
chased out of town by passing motorists, some of whom
fired out their windows at the getaway car. A similarly
violent defense against a stickup artist was mounted by a
woman filling station attendant in Joplin Missouri. When
asked for her day's receipts by two bandits, she sprayed the
triggerman with gasoline and shot him. The outlaw burst
into flames and fled.11 4
The result of the crime wave - and the public's reaction to it - was
an abnormally high homicide rate."'
January of 1934 brought an all-out press from the Roosevelt
Administration to fundamentally change the role the federal government
would have in law enforcement.116
113 POTTER, supra note 107, at 70. For example, the Cook County Banker's
Association armed 3,200 deputies during the late 1920s with sawed-off shotguns
and rifles. Id.
114 Id. at 72 (citing TULSA DAILY WORLD, Aug. 14, 1930; TULSA DAILY WORLD, Aug.
28, 1930).

115 National FirearmsAct: Hearing on H.R. 9066 Before the House Comm. On Ways
and Means, 73d Cong. 30 (1934) [hereinafter Hearings]. According to the
Justice Department, in 1931, there were 11,160 homicides in the United States,
as opposed to 287 in Great Britain for the same year. Id. at 30.
116 "Returning to home problems, we have been shocked by many notorious
examples of injuries done our citizens by persons or groups who have been living
off their neighbors by the use of methods either unethical or criminal. Crimes
of organized banditry, cold blooded shooting, lynching and kidnapping have
threatened our security. These violations of ethics and these violations of law call
on the strong arm of Government for their immediate suppression; they call also
on the country for an aroused public opinion." Franklin D. Roosevelt, Former
President of the United States, State of the Union Address to Congress (Jan. 3,

The SecondAmendment as Interpreted by Congress and the Court

255

At a national conference on crime, Roosevelt called for greater
federal crime efforts to fight "bandits" that were better equipped and
organized than the law.117 This war on crime allowed Roosevelt to
rally middle-class voters to support the concept of a strong federal law
enforcement effort to combat this new, interstate, dangerous criminal
element."'

Roosevelt soon sent his crime package to Congress.
Roosevelt's party's vast majorities in Congress'

Given

and the nation's "panicked"

mood over crime, Congress was expected to be extremely compliant with
Roosevelt's agenda for greater federal intervention on crime issues. 120 On
January 11, 1934, Roosevelt filed the 13 bills that became known as the
Omnibus Crime Bill. They were "designed to close gaps in existing federal
laws and to render more difficult the activities of predatory criminal gangs
of the Kelly and Dillinger types."121 By May 5, 1934, President Roosevelt
had already signed the first six acts of the Omnibus Crime Bill that
allowed federal agents to carry out independent, armed investigations
across state lines and made the murder of a government agent a federal
felony offense.122 By June 14, 1934, Congress had sent Roosevelt a total of
eleven crime bills for approval.123 Four days later, Congress sent Roosevelt
1934).
117 POTTER, supra note 107, at 124 (quoting President Roosevelt's Address to the
Conference on Crime, 3 PUB. PAPERS OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 495
(Dec. 10, 1934)).
118 Id. at 110.
119 In 1934, the Senate had 59 Democrats to 36 Republicans (of 96 seats), and the
House had 313 Democrats to just 117 Republicans and 5 members from other
parties. Infoplease.com, Composition of Congress, by Political Party, 18552010, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0774721.html (last visited Dec. 21,
2010).
120 POTTER, supra note 107, at 110.
121 78 CONG. REC. 11467 (1934) (statement of Sen. Copeland).
122 POTTER, supra note 107, at 137. See also Act of May 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73230, 48 Stat. 780 (providing punishment for killing or assaulting federal
officers).
123 See 78 CONG. REC. 11467-70 (1934). These bills included: Act of June 18,
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-569, 48 Stat. 979 ("An act to protect trade and commerce
against interference by violence, threats, coercion, or intimidation"); Act of June
13, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-324, 48 Stat. 948 ("An act to effectuate the purpose of
certain statutes concerning rates of pay for labor, by making it unlawful to
prevent anyone from receiving the compensation contracted for thereunder, and
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another act for his signature, the National Firearms Act (NFA),12 4 but this
was only a partial victory for the President.
As originally conceived by the Justice Department, H.R. 9066
would have regulated a wide range of firearms, including handguns and
larger capacity weapons, through the commerce and taxing powers of
Congress.125 The bill provided for annual registration and taxation for
the manufacturers, importers, and dealers of firearms for conducting
their businesses.126 The bill further required that a tax be paid on any
firearm "sold, assigned, transferred, given away, or otherwise disposed of.
for other purposes"); Act ofJune 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-293, 48 Stat. 909 ("An
act granting the consent of Congress to any two or more States to enter into
agreements or compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the
prevention of crime, and for other purposes"); Act of May 22, 1934, Pub. L. No.
73-246, 48 Stat. 794 ("An act to extend the provisions of the National Motor
Vehicle Theft Act to other stolen property"); Act of May 18, 1934, Pub. L. No.
73-235, 48 Stat. 783 ("An act to provide punishment for certain offenses
committed against banks organized or operating laws of the United States or any
member of the Federal Reserve System"); Act of May 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73234, 48 Stat. 782 ("An act to define certain crimes against the United States in
connection with the administration of Federal penal and correctional institutions
and to fix the punishment therefore"); Act of May 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73233, 48 Stat. 482 ("An act making it unlawful for any person to flee from one
state to another for the purpose of avoiding prosecution or the giving of
testimony in certain cases"); Act of May 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-232, 48 Stat.
481 ("An act to amend the act forbidding the transportation of kidnapped
person in interstate commerce"); Act of May 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-231, 48
Stat. 781 ("An act applying the powers of the Federal Government, under the
commerce clause of the Constitution, to extortion by means of telephone,
telegraph, radio, oral message, or otherwise"); Act of May 10, 1934, Pub. L. No.
73-217, 48 Stat. 772 ("An act to limit the operation of statutes of limitations in
certain cases").
124 National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 73-474,48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (prior to 1968
and 1986 amendments) (the long title was "An Act to prove for the taxation of
manufacturers, importers, and dealers in certain firearms and machine guns").
125 H.R. 9066, 73d Cong. (1934) (as reported by the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means) (defining the term "firearm" as "a pistol, revolver, shotgun having a
barrel less than sixteen inches in length, or any other firearm capable of being
concealed on the person, a muffler or silencer therefor, or a machine gun" and
the term "machine gun" as any weapon designed to shoot automatically or
semiautomatically twelve or more shots without reloading").
126 Id. § 2. Interestingly, the amount of the tax to be paid was left blank in the
original bill. Id. § 3(a).

The SecondAmendment as Interpreted by Congress and the Court

257

. . ."127 The transfer order would have a stamp proving payment of the tax,

creating a federal method of registration: anyone who wanted a firearm
had to provide the IRS identifying information including name, address,
fingerprints, and a photograph.128 Furthermore, anyone disposing of a
firearm also had to fill out an IRS form,129 1firearms not properly disposed
of were subject to forfeiture,3o and it would be unlawful to possess firearms
disposed of previously.,"
To carry a firearm in interstate commerce
required a permit with a photograph, fingerprints, and a description
of the firearm;132 further, possessors of firearms were presumed to have
transported them in interstate commerce unless the possessors had been
a resident of that state for more than sixty days, or had an IRS transfer
order. 133
The powerful House Committee on Ways and Means134 considered
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. 3(a).
Id. % 4(a)-(c).
Id. % 4(a)-(b).

Id. 6.

H.R. 9066, 73d Cong. § 5 (1934).
Id. § 10(a). The permit had a fee that the Justice Department did not specify in
the original bill. Id. § 10(c).
133 Id. § 10(d). Violators were subject to unspecified criminal penalties of
imprisonment and fines. Id. § 13 (as reported by the House Comm. on Ways
and Means).
134 It is hard to overstate how central the Ways and Means Committee was to the
business of the House. See generally ANTHONY CHAMPAGNE, DOUGLAS B.
HARRIS, JAMES W RIDDLESPERGER JR. & GARRISON NELSON, THE AuSTIN/
BOSTON CONNECTION: FIVE DECADES OF HOUSE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP,

1939-89 (2009). During most of the 20th century, the Committee was the
majority Democrats' "Committee on Committees" and decided which members
would be assigned to the other committees. Id. at 4. It was also a clear pathway
to leadership. As future Speaker of the House and Vice President of the United
States John Nance Garner wrote, "I know the Ways and Means Committee is
the most important committee in the House of Representatives and always will
be. It is the heart of the economic and political organization of the House of
Representatives." Id. at 45 (citing Letter from John Nance Gardner to Fred M.
Vinson (Nov. 13, 1931) (on file with the Wendell H. Ford Research Center and
Public Policy Archives, University of Kentucky, Lexington)). The Ways and
Means Committee in 1934 included future Speaker of the House John
McCormack and future Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Fred Vinson.
Hearings, supra note 115. The Chairman, Robert L. Doughton represented his
North Carolina district for 42 years and acted as Ways and Means Chairman for
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the National Firearms Act during five days of high-profile hearings in
April and May of 1934.135 Attorney General Homer Cummings led off
the hearings, testifying that the NFA was an important part of the Justice
Department's overall efforts against "a very serious national emergency."136
This emergency consisted of "predatory criminals," such as John Dillinger,
working in organized gangs on a nation-wide basis and moving rapidly
from state to state.137 The situation was made possible, in part, by a
"shadowy area or twilight zone between State and Federal power." The
scope of the problem was also immense: Cummings estimated that there
were currently 500,000 armed criminals "warring against society" - a
number higher than the Army and Navy forces combined. Cummings
testified:
A sawed-off shotgun is one of the most dangerous and
deadly weapons. A machine gun, of course, ought never
to be in the hands of any private individual. There is not
18 years between 1933 and 1953. See Biographical Directory of the United
States Congress - Robert L. Doughton, http:// http://bioguide.congress.gov/
biosearch/biosearch.asp (last visited Dec. 21, 2010).
135 Hearings, supra note 115, at 92 (statement of Assistant Att'y Gen. Joseph B.
Keenan). There was a considerable amount of interest in this bill while it was
before the Committee. In fact, the Committee members received so many
telegrams asking them to oppose the bill, several members accused the NRA of
promoting a "propaganda campaign" against the bill. This grassroots lobbying
effort also caused the Justice Department to respond that they too had a
tremendous amount of support, including thousands of letters from women's
organizations for the strict regulation of firearms. Id. at 92 ("We have not had
any telegrams sent to this committee; we have not attempted to generate any
propaganda. We have received literally thousands of letters from women's
organizations and other public spirited organizations asking that something be
done about the firearms evil, and we submit, that even though it is a little trouble
to have fingerprints taken, we believe it is not too great a donation to make to
the general safety of the public.").
136 Id. at 4 (statement of Att'y Gen. Homer Cummings).
137 Id. Later in his testimony, Cummings gave an example of the complexity of the
problem, "Take the Urschell kidnapping case. Urschell was kidnapped in
Oklahoma; he was carried into a remote section ofTexas; the demand for ransom
money came from Missouri, and there was already prepared a gang of confederates
in Minnesota to make disposition of the ransom money. There were other
groups in 3 different additional States and our representatives had to travel in 16
States in rounding up those criminals." Id. at 18.
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the slightest excuse for it, not at least in the world, and
we must, if we are going to be successful in this effort to
suppress crime in America, take these machine guns out
of the hands of the criminal class.138
Designed and manufactured in 1921 as a military weapon, the
Thompson Submachine Gun, or "Tommy Gun," became the gangster's
weapon of choice.139 How did machine guns140 get into the hands of
gangsters? Cummings blamed the four large machine gun manufacturers,
but singled out the Colt Company.1 4A
representative of Colt in turn
blamed the company that designed and commissioned the manufacture
of the Tommy Gun for being "careless" in their marketing the weapon,
and alleged that many submachine guns had been stolen from police
departments, prisons, and dealers.142
According to Cummings, the bill would be effective in removing
138 Id. at 6 (statement of Att'y Gen. Homer Cummings).
139 Id. at 6 (statement ofWB. Ryan, President of The Auto Ordinance Co.). Colt
had manufactured 15,000 of the Thompson Submachine guns for the Auto
Ordinance Company in 1921. Id. at 155 (statement of Frank C. Nichols, VicePresident of Colt Patent Firearms Manufacturing Co.). Although submachine
gun was not successful as a military weapon, WB. Ryan, the President of the
Auto Ordinance Company, testified that the submachine gun was being used by
the US military, and many peace officers around the country. Id. at 6 (statement
of WB. Ryan, President of The Auto Ordinance Co.).
140 Hearings, supra note 115, at 151 (statement of Frank C. Nichols, Vice-President
of Colt Patent Firearms Manufacturing Co.). Vice-President of Colt Firearms
Frank C. Nichols drew a distinction between the machine gun and the
submachine gun. A submachine gun, the preferred weapon of the underworld
during the 1920s and 1930s, is a small weapon capable of being carried under a
coat and capable of shooting 500 .45 caliber bullets from a drum feed. In
contrast, the machine guns produced by Colt weighed 65-90 pounds, shot a
high powered military cartridge and were sold exclusively to the US government
or foreign governments.
141 Id. at 11 (statement of Att'y Gen. Homer Cummings) (the four manufacturers
being Colt Manufacturing Co., Smith & Wesson, Harrington & Richardson,
and Iver Johnson). Cummings testified that by 1934, however, there was only
one manufacturer, Colt, that manufactured the type of machine gun being used
by gangsters and they had a "gentleman's agreement" with the Justice Department
to take "far greater care" in the distribution of machine guns.
142 Id. at 151-52 (statement of Frank C. Nichols, Vice-President of Colt Patent
Firearms Manufacturing Co.).
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firearms from criminals or limiting their use in several ways. First, the tax
on the production of the firearms would make the weapons too expensive
to obtain.141 Second, the new paperwork requirements would make it
possible to trace the transfer and disposal of firearms. Third, assuming
that criminals would not pay their taxes or obtain the proper paperwork,
making illegal the transportation of firearms across state lines would
allow federal prosecutors to charge gangsters with violations of the NFA,
causing forfeitures and simplifying prosecution.144
Cummings characterized the bill as drastic,145 but said that the
Justice Department resisted calls to do even more to regulate firearms.146
These calls even came from congressmen during the hearing. Cumming
143 Id. at 11 (statement of Att'y Gen. Homer Cummings). When asked to specify
what the taxes would be, Cummings proposed a "reasonable" tax on
manufacturers and importers of $5,000, a tax on dealers of $200, a tax on
machine guns of $200 and a tax on any other firearm of $1. Since the cost of a
machine gun in 1934 was estimated by the Justice Department to be about
$200, this represented a 100 percent tax. Id.
144 Id. at 9-12 (statement of Att'y Gen. Homer Cummings) ("So if, for instance,
Dillinger, or any other of those roving criminals, not having proper credentials,
should carry a revolver, a pistol, a sawed-off shotgun, or machine gun, across a
State line and we could demonstrate that fact, that of itself would be an offense,
and the weapons would be forfeited. Therefore, when we capture one of those
people, we have simply a plain question to propound to him - where is your
license; where is your permit? If he cannot show it, we have got him and his
weapons and we do not have to go through an elaborate trial, with all kinds of
complicated questions arising."). Cummings also detailed the criminal penalties
to be a fine of $2,000 and imprisonment for not more than five years. Id. at 12.
145 Hearings, supra note 115, at 5 (statement of Att'y Gen. Homer Cummings).
146 Id. at 5-6. ("For instance, this bill does not touch in any way the owner, or
possessor, or dealer in the ordinary shotgun or rifle" because "[t]he sportsman
who desires to go out and shoot ducks, or the marksman who desires to go out
and practice, perhaps wishing to pass from one State to another, would not like
to be embarrassed, or troubled, or delayed by too much detail."). Cummings
testified that experts advised the Justice Department that the maximum length
of a shotgun would be better placed at 18 or 20 inches, rather than the 16-inch
minimum in the bill. Id. at 6 (statement of Att'y Gen. Homer Cummings).
Another possible provision not included in the bill would have been to require a
federal permit for anyone traveling across state lines with a firearm that they
owned before the NFA would go into effect; which would have reached many
hundreds of thousands of small firearms. Id. at 3, see also id. at 10. (statement of
Att'y Gen. Homer Cummings).
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stated that while he was not opposed to Congress expanding the bill,14 7
he recognized that "there is a great deal of hesitancy in expanding federal
powers too much."14 Regulations on sawed-off shotguns and machine
guns, however, were well justified to stop the criminal gangster.149
The Committee heard from several people and organizations
opposed to the bill, including General Milton A. Reckord,15o NRA
President Karl T. Frederick,151 Charles V. Imlay,152 the Izaak Walton
League of America,15 and the American Legion. Reckord and Frederick,
representing the NRA, argued that while some regulation of firearms may
be needed,154 the registration requirements and proposed tax on dealers
and manufacturers would only serve to disarm the "the honest man,"
not the gangster. Opponents claimed that the proposed $200 tax would
eliminate 95 percent of all firearms dealers.155 Putting this many dealers
147 Id. at 7, 13 (statements of Rep. Frear and Rep. McClintic) (responding to
Representative Frear asking why the bill did not include situations where a
criminal is in possession of bullet proof vests or other such protective clothing
and to Representative McClintic asking if the registration provision could be
expanded to those people who already owned the targeted weapons).
148 Id. at 7 (statement of Att'y Gen. Homer Cummings).
149 Id. at 6-7.

150 Id. at 33.
151 Hearings, supra note 115, at 38. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Frederick was
the President of the NRA. Id.
152 Id. at 67. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Imlay was a member of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, who helped draft the Uniform
Firearms Act and had 11 years experience working on state firearm legislation.
Id.at 67-68.
153 Id. at 161. The resolution - presented to the Committee by Seth Gordon pointed out that 13 million citizens hunt and target shoot, and that the bill
sought the restriction on the sale of firearms, which would "merely disarm the
law-abiding citizens" and not effectively deal with the crime situation. Id. This
resolution relies on a Second Amendment argument. The final line reads,
"Resolved, That ... the Izaak Walton League ofAmerica ... go on record as being
opposed to any and all antifirearms legislation that will in any way affect the
right of our citizens to own and bear arms freely." Id.
154 Id. at 60 (statement of Karl T. Frederick, President of the National Rifle
Association of America).
155 Id. at 42-44. Frederick testified that after a $10 fee was imposed on dealers in
Pennsylvania, after three or four years many of the small town dealers stopped
selling guns. Id. at 44 (statement of Karl T. Frederick, President of the National
Rifle Association of America). See id.at 156 (statement of Frank C. Nichols,
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out of business would deprive people in rural areas or small towns of
the opportunity to obtain a firearm.156 Having fewer dealers would also
force some large pistol manufacturers to stop producing handguns.157
In addition, the $5,000 tax on manufacturers, while affordable to the
largest four companies, would put many small manufacturers, such as
the ones that produced custom barrels for shooting competitions, out of
business. 158
B.

ConstitutionalQuestions

Cummings was careful to point out the efforts the Justice
Department took in drafting a constitutional bill several times during
his testimony.159 Still, this effort was directed at finding a constitutionally
permissible authority for Congress to regulate firearms. With no inherent
police powers, the Justice Department felt Congress could only act when
there was an issue involving taxation, mail, or interstate commerce. 160
Vice-President of Colt Patent Firearms Manufacturing Co.).
156 Id. at 91 (statement of Rep. Woodruff) (stating that he was from a rural district
where dealers "who have a desire to supply peaceable law-abiding citizens with a
means to defend themselves could not possibly pay that $200 a year").
157 Hearings, supra note 115, at 157 (statement of Frank C. Nichols, Vice-President
of Colt Patent Firearms Manufacturing Co.) (pointing out that Colt had been in
business for nearly 100 years and how valuable Colt was to the government
during World War I, but also that they could not maintain a plant to assist the
government just in case of war).
158 Id. at 49 (testimony of Karl T. Frederick, President of the National Rifle
Association of America).
159 Id. at 4 (statement of Att'y Gen. Homer Cummings) ("All these bills have been
drafted with an eye to constitutional limitations .... ); id. at 5 ("Now, we have
established in our Department an organization to.. . concentrate on a program
that is constitutional . . . ."); id. at 10 ("Bearing in mind our limitations of the
constitutional character, bearing in mind our limitations to extend our power
beyond the immediate requirements of the problem, this is our best thought on
the subject."); id. at 13 (when asked if the bill could include the registration of
current weapons, "I am afraid it would be unconstitutional.").
160 Id. at 133 (statement of Assistant Att'y Gen. Joseph B. Keenan) (testifying that
although there were no Supreme Court decisions to guide the drafting process,
the registration of all firearms would likely be constitutional "if it be attempted
and considered to be a reasonable regulation, and a reasonable protective step
taken by the law enforcement agency to collect the tax provided in the main
body of the act").
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This bill worked off of established congressional authority.161 When
Congressman Treadway asked why Congress could not simply prohibit
the manufacture or possession of machine guns, Keenan testified, "I do
not think we could prohibit anyone from owning them. I do not think
that power resides with Congress."162
When asked how this bill "escaped" the constitutional provision
"denying the privilege to the legislature to take away the right to carry
arms,"163 Attorney General Cummings responded:
Oh, we do not attempt to escape it. We are dealing with
another power, namely the power of taxation, and the
regulation of interstate commerce clause. You see, if we
made a statute absolutely forbidding any human being
to have a machine gun, you might say there is some
constitutional question involved. But when you say "We
will tax the machine gun" and when you say that "the
absence of a license showing payment of the tax has been
made indicates that a crime has been perpetrated" you are
easily within the law.164
Congress did have the power, however, to tax handguns and, in
doing so, make them too expensive or too difficult to obtain for most
Americans - proving the adage that the power to tax is the power to

161 Id. at 162-63 (statement of Assistant Att'y Gen. Joseph B. Keenan) (testifying
that the government expected to bring in $356,000 in annual revenue from the
taxes proposed in the bill and that that the registration of firearms, even those
owned prior to this legislation, would be constitutional given the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332 (1928), which found the
provisions of the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act constitutional). There were already
tax provisions on firearms in operation, a 10 percent ad valorem tax on pistols
and revolvers that produced $35,388 in 1933. Hearings, supra note 115, at 6.
The bill's provisions also tracked the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act which the
Supreme Court had already found constitutional. Id. at 163 (statement of
Assistant Att'y Gen. Joseph B. Keenan).
162 Hearings, supra note 115, at 100 (statement of Assistant Att'y Gen. Joseph B.
Keenan).
163 Id. at 19 (statement of Rep. Lewis).
164 Id. (statement of Att'y Gen. Homer Cummings).
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destroy.161 If, as I argued above, the Second Amendment was created
for both personal and community protection, the Committee needed to
consider whether individuals still had a legitimate right to firearms. In
most places, state and local police had replaced the sheriffs posse, and
national defense had been entrusted to a small standing force that could
grow through the draft during wartime. The traditional militia existed,
but was starting to be reworked into the National Guard that we know
today. In the face of a public safety crisis, how far did an individual right
to bear arms extend?
Several witnesses pointed out the legitimate use of firearms,
a fact often forgotten or ignored by people who wanted to eliminate
guns. 166 Firearms were used legitimately not just by law enforcement and
for national defense, but also for private security for businesses such as
banks, the protection of the person or property, training in the event of
military necessity, and the use of pistols in sports such as target shooting
and hunting.167 These legitimate uses were recognized by every state and
even rose to the level of constitutional guarantees.16 1
Obviously, law enforcement and the military needed to be
equipped with handguns, shotguns, and even machine guns. 16 1 The Justice
Department also conceded that vulnerable businesses like banks needed
firearms, including machine guns, for protection.170 Rifles were not
165 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819) ("That the power to tax
involves the power to destroy ... [is] not to be denied.").
166 Hearings, supra note 115, at 74 (citing Charles V. Imlay, The Capper FirearmsBill
- Its Relation to the Uniform FirearmsAct, FED. BAR AsS'N JOURNAL (March

1932)).
167 Id. at 75-76 (quoting Karl T. Frederick, Pistol Regulation - Its Principles and
History, AMERICAN RIFLEMAN, Issues of Dec. 1930-July 1931).
168 Id. at 74 (citing Imlay, supra note 166).
169 But see id. at 106 (Statement of J. Weston Allen, Chairman of the National
Crime Commission) (stating that it may be safer to have the police not carry
firearms). A resolution from the American Legion submitted at the hearing by
John Thomas Taylor, representing the American Legion, recommended the
passage of laws by Congress and the states to end the sale of machine guns,
submachine guns and to restrict those weapons to "the organized military forces
and law enforcement authorities" of the U.S. and the states. Id. at 80.
170 Id. at 13-14 (statement of Att'y Gen. Homer Cummings) (Attorney General
Cummings replying that there were other conceivable legitimate uses, such as
protecting banks, when asked why Congress should permit the sale of machine
guns outside of law enforcement).
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included in the original proposal to protect hunters, and the Committee
did not need much convincing to protect hunting or marksmanship.171
What, then, of the need for armed citizens to play a role in national
defense? Given the centrality of the militia to the Second Amendment's
prefatory clause, one would think this would have been an important
topic for the Committee. In fact, there was very little testimony as to
arms being necessary to support national defense. This is surprising
since one main witness at the hearing, General Reckord, commanded
Maryland's militia and is considered one of the principal architects of
the modern National Guard. Other than mentioning the role of NRA
marksmen in training troops during World War I, there was no debate
on the subject.172 No one at the time could foresee the military buildup that was to come after the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the Justice
Department was apparently skeptical about the need for civilians trained
in small arms for a future war.17 1 Perhaps General Reckord shared the
Justice Department's view, as he did not make an issue out of the need for
military preparedness despite having many chances to do so.
Some of the bill's opponents had trouble articulating why it
violated the Second Amendment and claimed not to have given it much
study.174 Opponents such as the NRA claimed to have never considered the
171 Hunting and the use of firearms by "sportsmen" are only mentioned sporadically
throughout the hearings. See, e.g., id. at 13 (statement of Rep. Knutson). A
resolution from the Izaak Walton League of America to the Congress pointed
out that 13 million citizens hunt and target shoot, and the bill's restrictions on
the sale of firearms would disarm the law abiding citizens and not effectively deal
with the crime situation. Id. at 161 (statement of Seth Gordon).
172 Hearings, supra note 115, at 110 (statement of Hon. Milton A. Reckord,
Adjutant Gen. of Md.). General Reckord stated, "I mention this as an indication
of the value of arming and training our average reputable citizens instead of
discouraging and restricting their armament and proper training." Id.
173 Id. at 165. General Reckord stated that in a conversation with Assistant Attorney
General Keenan, Keenan dismissed training people for the national defense in
that "the next war would not be won by small arms," and in the future "the
individual soldier, the small arms, and the ships of the fleet would be of no
tangible value." Id.
174 Id. at 53 (statement of Karl T. Frederick, President, National Rifle Association of
America and Rep. John W McCormack, Member, House Comm. on Ways and
Means). As one Committee member claimed, it was the approach the Justice
Department took to address the gun issue that caught the NRA unprepared
rather than "powerful evidence," that opponents did not think the Second
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federal government restricting gun ownership through indirect methods
such as taxing and commerce powers.175 Although opponents admitted
that Congress could pass regulatory laws through its taxing power,176 they
accused the government of "side-stepping" the Constitution. One witness
called the effort "repugnant."177 Still, the Committee heard a great deal of
testimony as to whether people had a right to a handgun either to defend
the community or themselves. The NRA representatives testified that
there were "hundreds of instances" where people needed to travel outside
of their home with a pistol for self-defense purposes.178 General Reckord
claimed that armed citizens prevented or stopped crimes, and that a pistol
or revolver "makes the smallest man or the weakest woman the equal of
the burliest thug."171 The American Legion also objected to proposals
affecting "the great mass of law-abiding citizens who are interested in
having revolvers and pistols of their own as a protection.1so This need for
self-protection was especially true in the more rural areas where "police
forces [were] not adequate."181
The common defense aspect that I argue was so essential to the
creation of the right had not entirely disappeared, either. If citizens were
disarmed, they would not be able to assist law enforcement. Frederick
testified that armed citizens were as necessary to the anti-crime effort as
the police.182 Charles Imlay asked the Committee to consider that rural
Amendment was threatened.
175 Id. at 53 (statement of Karl T. Frederick, President, National Rifle Association of
America).

176 Id. at 53-54.
177 Hearings, supra note 115, at 148 (statement of Charles V. Imlay, Rep., National
Conference on Uniform Law).
178 Id. at 48 (statement of Karl T. Frederick, President, National Rifle Association of
America).
179 Id. at 113-14 (statement of Hon. Milton A. Reckord, Adjutant Gen. of Md.).
General Reckord stated that in 1932 in Chicago, 63 hold-up men and burglars
were killed by gunfire. Of that number, 40 percent were killed by armed citizens.
In 1933, 71 "thugs" were killed in Chicago, with nearly 50 percent killed by
armed citizens.
180 Id. at 80 (statement of John Thomas Taylor, Rep., American Legion).
181 Id. at 43 (statement of Karl T. Frederick, President, National Rifle Association of
America).
182 Id. at 52-53. In my opinion, the forces which are opposed to crime consist of
two general bodies; one is the organized police and the second is the unorganized
victims, the great mass of unorganized law-abiding citizens, and if you destroy
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citizens were still needed to fight crime, and that the preferred weapon
was now a pistol:
[W]hen you take the history of firearms and their
legitimate use in history, what do you find? You find that
law and order has always been enforced by the citizen
body and you can go now into some of our rural sections
and you can find it is still true, as it was in the early part of
the Republic, that when the sheriff goes after a gangster,
he can go from house to house and he can be sure there
is a house holder there with a weapon. It was once a
shotgun or rifle, but it is now a pistol, and the weapon
is as much a part of the equipment of that household as
the Bible on the mantle, but when you go into the city,
and much of this legislation has come out of the city, you
find a different situation. I ask you, before attempting a
system of regulation like this, that you consider somebody
other than the attorneys general, somebody other than the
police, and consider the citizen, the one that is primarily
affected.18

Registration of firearms was also an important aspect of the bill and
a much-debated topic during the hearings. Proponents argued that there
would never be "efficient control of firearms in this country" until firearms
were registered.114 Chairman Doughton and Representative Shallenberger
agreed, saying at one point that it would be a great benefit to have every
person with an "implement of death" recorded.", Opponents argued
against the registration requirements weighed "on the great broad principle
the effective opposition of either one of those, you are inevitably going to
increase crime . . . . I think we should be careful in considering the actual
operation of regulatory measures to make sure that they do not hamstring the
law-abiding citizen in his opposition to the crook.
183 Hearings, supra note 115, at 147-48 (statement of Charles V. Imlay, Rep.,
National Conference on Uniform Law).
184 Id. at 103 (statement of J. Weston Allen, Chairman, National Anti-Crime
Comm.).
185 Id. at 125 (statement of Rep. Ashton C. Shallenberger, Member, House Comm.
on Ways and Means).

268

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITYLAWJOURNAL Vol.3, No. 1

of personal Liberty."16 As a practical matter, comprehensive registration
had been tried and discarded in several states because it caused resentment
and purposeful law-breaking among its citizens. 1 7 The opponents of
registration found an ally in Congressman Vinson, who consistently called
the registration provisions of the bill "anti-constitutional."'
Vinson
compared the registration requirements to Czarist Russia, where people
were sent to Siberia for "trivial offenses," rather than the actual activity
the government wanted to punish.' Assistant Attorney General Keenan
claimed that such fears were overblown, and that, even if a law-abiding
citizen did not register, he would not be in trouble so long as he did not
come to the "notice of the police."90
The Justice Department had significant support on the Committee
for its proposal despite the arguments that it would violate constitutional
rights. Congressman Lewis argued that "certain people overstate their
rights" to carry firearms and wondered "what restrictions a law-abiding
citizen of Great Britain and these other countries is willing to accept in
the way of duty to society?",,, Committee Chairman Doughton suggested
186 Id. at 124 (statement of Hon. Milton A. Reckord, Adjutant Gen. of Md.).
187 Id. at 68 (statement of Charles V. Imlay, Rep., National Conference. on Uniform
Law). The Uniform Act also rejected some of the "extreme theories" of gun
regulation such as the state-wide registration of pistols in Arkansas law of 1923,
which was repealed a few years later. Id. at 143-44.
188 Id. at 143-44 (statement of Fred M. Vinson, Rep., H. Comm. on Ways and
Means). It should be noted that Congressman Vinson would later administer
the NFA as Secretary of the Treasury and would ultimately be named the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court.

189 Hearings, supra note 115, at 120.
190 Id. at 136 (statement of Hon. Joseph B. Keenan, Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of
Justice). Keenan claimed there would not be "snooping squads going from
house to house to see who does and who does not possess firearms."
191 Id. at 18-19, 28 (statement of Rep. David J. Lewis, Member, H. Comm. on
Ways and Means). After this hearing the Justice Department provided a
memorandum outlining the British Firearms Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 43,
which stated that the British law was not only more burdensome and rigorous
than the proposed HR 9066, but was more drastic than even New York's
"Sullivan Law." The British law regulated the sale and possession of every kind
of firearm and ammunition. Local police chiefs approve firearm certificates,
which are valid for 3 years, cost $25 and are revocable. Britain also strictly
regulated dealers, who could only sell to people with valid certificates and had to
report all sales within 48 hours.
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that registration was acceptable and that people should be willing
to "surrender some minor privilege . . . for the general good."192 Still,
the NRA contended that the Bill would violate constitutional rights,",
and suggested that testing the law would be a difficult, drawn out, and
expensive proceeding.114
The Committee also dealt with a significant federalism question.
If there is an individual right to possess firearms, and that right is
absolute,195 who should regulate? States, exercising their police powers,
did and continue to regulate firearms.196 Traditionally, states recognized
the legitimacy of certain weapons and forbade concealed weapons; some
states required the registration of firearms and their purchasers.197 This Bill
would have been the first attempt by Congress to step into an area that
had been exclusively a state issue, and some members of the Committee
seemed anxious for a greater federal role.198 Opponents argued, however,
192 Hearings, supra note 115, at 123 (statement of Rep. Robert L. Doughton,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways and Means).
193 Id. at 60 (testimony of Karl T. Frederick, President, National Rifle Association
of America). Frederick stated that he had grave doubts that Congress could pass
a measure that would be effective and not unnecessarily infringe on the rights of
law-abiding citizens. Id.
194 Id. at 166 (testimony of Milton A. Reckord, Adjutant Gen. of Md.).
195 Id. at 60 (testimony of Karl T. Frederick, President, National Rifle Association
of America).
196 Id. at 138 (testimony of Charles V. Imlay, representing the National Conference
on Uniform Law). Charles Imlay, appearing on behalf of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, testified state regulation
of firearms had "progressed to completeness in practically all of the States" and
should not be a matter of federal legislation. Part of this state oriented effort was
the Uniform Firearm Act, which the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws began to draft in 1923. The Act was to be a uniform law
that might be adopted by all states and create a similar set of regulations
throughout the country. The Uniform Firearm Act was adopted by Congress for
the District of Columbia in 1932. Imlay, supra note 166, at 138.
197 Hearings,supra note 115, at 138.
198 Id. at 148-49 (testimony of Charles V. Imlay, representing the National
Conference on Uniform Law). One member of the Committee made the point
that state gun laws had not stopped the gangster. The Justice Department
testified that some states failed to enact even basic firearm laws, pointing to
Illinois's refusal to pass an act making it unlawful to possess a machine gun
without a permit. Congressman Shallenberger even suggested that greater
federal involvement was the trend and that even hunting and fishing could be a
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that the firearm problem was "impossible to regulate" federally.199 State
laws were superior because the method of enforcement was immediate,
and the level of regulation was more likely to be supported by the
community.200 Furthermore, federal regulations would cause difficulty
between state and federal law enforcement and could even cause states to
leave the issue to the federal officers entirely.201 One opponent, Mr. Imlay,
argued that federal law should be limited to the interstate transportation
of weapons in violation of state laws, like the Mann Act. 202
During the hearing, it became clear that several members of the
Committee, while fully supportive of limiting public access to machine
guns and sawed-off shotguns, were uncomfortable making it a federal
felony for a citizen to possess a pistol.203 Several members of the Committee
suggested exempting gun clubs,2o4 Or better, eliminating handguns from
the scope of the bill.25 This brought considerable resistance from the

199
200

201
202

203
204

205

subject for federal licensing. Id. at 124-26 (testimony ofAshton C. Shallenberger,
Nebraska, H. Comm. on Ways and Means).
Id. at 60 (testimony of Karl T. Frederick, President, National Rifle Association
of America).
Id. at 139 (testimony of Charles V. Imlay, representing the National Conference
on Uniform Law). If federal firearm regulations were too difficult or unpopular
with "regular gun owners" it could lead to the same lawlessness recently
experienced with the Volstead Act. Id. at 140 (testimony of Charles V. Imlay,
representing the National Conference on Uniform Law).
Id. at 140, 146 (testimony of Charles V. Imlay, representing the National
Conference on Uniform Law).
Id. at 148 (testimony of Charles V. Imlay, representing the National Conference
on Uniform Law). Still, another proposal before Congress, HR 9399, at the
time pending before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, that
would prevent the shipment of machine guns, submachine guns, sawed off
shotguns, and bullet proof vests in interstate commerce, would have the same
effect. Imlay went so far as to include pistols in this regulation. Id. at 149
(testimony of Charles V. Imlay, representing the National Conference on
Uniform Law).
Hearings,supra note 115, at 115 (testimony of Fred M. Vinson, Kentucky, H.
Comm. On Ways and Means).
Id. at 119 (testimony of James V. McClintic, Oklahoma, H. Comm. On Ways
and Means). The Justice Department drafted such an exemption in a later draft.
Still, the NRA's representatives objected to such a provision, in that it would give
their members rights over "all other honest citizens." Id.
Id. at 110 (testimony of Milton A. Reckord, Adjutant Gen. of Md.). Rep.
Claude Fuller stated there was resentent by law-abiding people as to over-

The SecondAmendment as Interpreted by Congress and the Court

271

Justice Department. Attorney General Cummings stated that it would be
a terrible mistake to pass any "half-way measures" on firearms.206 Assistant
Attorney General Keenan argued that the gangster uses not just machine
guns, but pistols and revolvers. Federal law, therefore, had to "make it
expensive" to use handguns as well as machine guns, including running
the risk of prosecution. 207
After several days of testimony, the Justice Department offered
a redrafted bill that relied wholly on Congress's taxing power. The new
draft required the registration of all firearms, with the exception of .22
caliber rim fire pistols, and rifles and shotguns having barrels longer
than 18 inches. Furthermore, failure to register the firearm within four
months of the NFA's passage would be a violation of the law.208 There was,
however, no penalty for failing to register, which Congressman Vinson
pointed out made it nearly impossible to test the constitutionality of
the law.209 General Reckord called this a "subterfuge" to get weapons
registered without testing the law's constitutionality.210 Congressman
Vinson questioned how a firearm already in someone's possession could
be registered under the taxing power, since it could not be taxed until
transferred.211 Keenan defended the tougher registration requirements to
get control of the firearms already in people's possession, and to prosecute
gangsters who obtained their weapons before the passage of the law.

206
207

208
209
210
211

regulation of pistols and asked, "[w] ould it ... seriously injure the object and
purpose of this bill if you would eliminate pistols and let us get as strong a law
as possible for sawed-off shotguns and machine guns - the very thing you are
trying to reach?" Id. at 22. General Reckord offered an amendment that would
make the interstate transportation of any stolen firearm a felony carrying a 10year sentence and a $10,000 fine. Id. at 110.
Id. at 22 (testimony of Hon. Homer S. Cummings, Att'y Gen. of the U.S.).
Id. at 117-18 (testimony of Hon. Joseph B. Keenan, Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't
ofJustice). Keenan found support from some members of the Committee. "[A]
thousand criminals will use pistols where one will use a machine gun." Id.
(citing id. at 120 (testimony of James V. McClintic, Oklahoma, H. Comm. On
Ways and Means)).
Id. at 121 (testimony of Milton A. Reckord, Adjutant Gen. of Md.).
Hearings, supra note 115, at 122, 135 (testimony of Fred M. Vinson, Kentucky,
H. Comm. On Ways and Means).
Id. at 122 (testimony of Milton A. Reckord, Adjutant Gen. of Md.).
Id. at 133-34 (testimony of Fred M. Vinson, Kentucky, H. Comm. On Ways
and Means).
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Attorney General Cummings opened the hearing with a clear focus
on the gangster and framed the bill as a method to stop the use of firearms
in criminal activity. Throughout the hearing, the Justice Department
refused to eliminate small weapons such as pistols and revolvers from the
scope of the Bill.212 That recalcitrance, combined with Assistant Attorney
General Keenan's remarks, showed that the Justice Department intended
to go beyond the gangster - it wanted to fundamentally change the way
guns, including handguns, were sold and used in the United States.
Federal law would be the tool to prevent potential future criminals from
ever becoming familiar with firearms:
[T]he hardened criminal was not always a hardened
criminal. He was once a youngster, and he bought or got
a gun, and he learned how to use the gun at the time when
he was not a hardened criminal. Probably the young boy
who is now faced with no penalty for possessing a firearm,
if there is a penalty, might think once or twice before he
runs afoul of the federal laws.213
Likewise, the Bill's requirement that stolen weapons must be
reported to police, would cause all people to be more careful of the use of
firearms; "They will realize that it means something to them to have a gun,
if they have to account for it."214 To the Justice Department, there was little
difference between the machine gun and the pistol - it was just a matter
of which killed more effectively.215 For this reason, Keenan suggested that
the tax on dealers stay at the prohibitive $200 to "have the sale of guns
in the hands of as few people as possible" and allow the government to
better track these weapons and "see whether they are sold to the wrong
people."216 Keenan went so far as to suggest that pistols should only be
available to the government or law enforcement, but acknowledged that
Congress did not have that power; however, he suggested that the states
212 Id. at 81 (testimony of Milton A. Reckord, Adjutant Gen. of Md.).
213 Id. at 92 (testimony of Hon. Joseph B. Keenan, Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of
Justice).
214 Hearings, supra note 115, at 95 (testimony of Hon. Joseph B. Keenan, Assistant
Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice).
215 Id. at 101.
216 Id.
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take such a step.217 Finally, Assistant Attorney General Keenan admitted
that this bill was just a start, and that "[i]t may take many, many years
before we make real headway in the control of firearms."218
Despite the efforts of the Justice Department, the Ways and Means
Committee significantly limited the scope of the bill. The unanimous
report of the Ways and Means Committee219 refocused the bill on the
gangster: "the gangster as a law violator must be deprived of his most
dangerous weapon, the machine gun." The Committee took the position
that the taxing of sawed-off guns and machine guns was sufficient to
achieve this goal. The Committee, however, did not include pistols and
revolvers: "while there is justification for permitting the citizen to keep a
pistol or revolver for his own protection without any restriction, there is
no reason why anyone except a law officer should have a machine gun or
sawed-off shotgun."220 Machine gun and sawed-off shotgun importers,
manufacturers, pawnbrokers, and dealers would pay steep taxes.221 In
addition, the Bill required persons transferring these firearms to obtain a
written order and pay a $200 tax. The firearms transferee had to submit
fingerprints and a photograph on his registration application. Anyone in
possession of one of these firearms had to register within 60 days of the
Bill's effective date, and there would be a non-conclusive presumption
that anyone in possession of such a firearm came into possession of it after
the effective date of the law. The Bill allowed the forfeiture of firearms
transferred in violation of the Bill. The Bill made the transportation in
interstate commerce of any machine gun or sawed-off shotgun without
217 Id. at 101-02. Apparently, Keenan suggested something similar during
discussions with the NRA on revising this bill. General Reckford reported to the
Committee that the Justice Department believed the ideal solution to the gun
problem was to have the government manufacture all firearms and then refuse to
sell arms "to anyone it might choose." Id. at 165

218 Id.at 9 5.
219 H.R. REP. No. 73-1780, at 1 (1934).
220 Id. The Committee's bill defines "firearm" as including any shotgun or rifle with
a barrel less than 18 inches, a machine gun, and a muffler or silencer for any
firearm, including pistols and handguns. Pistols, revolvers, and ordinary long
shotguns and rifles are not taxed, nor is their shipment, possession, or use
regulated.
221 Id. at 2. Section 2 requires importers of firearms to pay an annual occupational
tax of $1,000, manufacturers to pay $1,000, pawnbrokers to pay $300, and
other dealers to pay $200. Id.
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a valid stamp-affixed order punishable by a fine of up to $2,000 or
imprisonment for up to 5 years. 222
On the House floor, Chairman Doughton informed the chamber
that the Committee had limited the bill to machine guns and sawed-off
shotguns. This change, he assured the House membership, had removed
the objections of sportsmens' organizations, and he said that the Justice
Department also supported the bill. While acknowledging the pressure
from womens' organizations for the more comprehensive bill regulating
pistols and revolvers, Doughton defended the more limited bill.223 He
stated that the Committee wanted to protect the "law-abiding citizen:"
[T] he ordinary, law-abiding citizen who feels that a pistol
or a revolver is essential in his home for the protection of
himself and his family should not be classed with criminals,
racketeers, and gangsters; should not be compelled to
register his firearms and have his fingerprints taken and
be placed in the same class with gangsters, racketeers, and
those who are known as criminals."224
Chairman Doughton assured one member that this Bill did not
interfere with the rights of states to tax dealers in firearms.225 The only
Senate amendment reduced the license tax on manufacturers, wholesalers
and importers from $1,000 to $500. President Roosevelt signed the Bill
into law shortly thereafter, completing the Omnibus Crime Bill package.
The NFA provided federal law enforcement with a valuable new tool to
prosecute gangsters, but did not remake gun ownership in the United
States. The NFA's constitutionality would soon be tested in the federal
courts.

Challenge to the NFA and Second Amendment

C.

The Justice Department, not the NRA, ultimately forced the courts
to rule on the NFA's constitutionality. Having seen its efforts to severely
limit gun ownership largely fail before Congress, the Justice Department
222
223
224
225

Id. at 4 .
78 CONG. REC. 11, 400 (1934).

Id.
Id.
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sought to have the judiciary find that the Second Amendment did not
pose a barrier to more sweeping federal gun legislation. A small-time
hoodlum provided the test case they were looking for, not only to test the
NFA, but also to redefine the Second Amendment. Unfortunately for
the Justice Department, the result of the case was the terribly muddled
decision in United States v. Miler.226
At the heart of the Miller case was small-time gangster Jackson
Miller, who had contributed to the crime spree of the mid 1930s. 227 In
April of 1938, the Arkansas and Oklahoma state police arrested Miller
and a partner after they traveled from Oklahoma into Arkansas.228 Police
believed the pair were "making preparation for armed robbery" and
recovered an unregistered sawed-off shotgun.229 Miller had brought an
unregistered sawed-off shotgun across state lines,230 and he could not prove
he had paid the taxes on the weapon. 231 The Justice Department not only
indicted the men for a violation of the NFA, but also immediately saw the
opportunity for a test of the NFA and the Second Amendment.232 After the
federal district court judge refused to accept a guilty plea, the defendants
demurred to the indictment, in part, challenging the constitutionality
226 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
227 Brian L. Frye, The PeculiarStory of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 48, 53 (2008) (Miller was once a member of the notorious O'Malley
gang that had robbed a string of banks in Arkansas and Oklahoma and had
participated in kidnapping in 1934-1935).
228 Id. at 58 (citing FirearmsTest Case Probable at Ft. Smith, ARK. DEMOCRAT, Jan.
4, 1939, at 2; Telegram from Clinton Barry, United States Attorney for the
Western District of Arkansas, to the Attorney General of the United States (Apr.
23, 1938) (National Archives and Records Administration)).
229 Id.

230 Id.
231 Id. at 59.
232 Id. at 59-60 (citing Indictment, United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002 No.
3926 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 21, 1938)). "Sec. 11. It shall be unlawful for any person
who is required to register as provided in section 5 hereof and who shall not have
so registered, or any other person who has not in his possession a stamp-affixed
order as provided in section 4 hereof, to ship, carry, or deliver any firearm in
interstate commerce." Miller, 307 U.S. at 175 n.1. The U.S. Attorney for the
Western District of Arkansas Clinton R. Barry telegraphed his request to
Washington asking for federal agents to investigate the case and "prove possession
[of] this weapon in Oklahoma immediately before arrest in Arkansas to show
transportation." Frye, supra note 227, at 59.
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of the NFA under the Second and Tenth Amendments.233 The judge, an
outspoken advocate for greater gun control,234 quashed the indictment on
the grounds that the NFA violated the Second Amendment235 and was an
unconstitutional "attempt to usurp police power reserved to the states."236
Although Miller disappeared and did not participate in his appeal,237 the
Justice Department had an excellent case to keep its expanded powers,
and perhaps to expand them further.238
In January 1939, the U.S. Attorney appealed the Miller decision
directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. Without any precedent to support
its position, the government's brief offered several different arguments
supporting the constitutionality of the NFA. First, the Solicitor General
claimed the Second Amendment simply prohibited Congress from
infringing a common law right to form a militia by the collective body
of citizens; the Second Amendment, therefore, did not grant individuals
the right to carry firearms.239 In the alternative, the Justice Department
argued that the Second Amendment only guaranteed the right to bear
arms "for lawful purposes," and therefore, does not protect the "arsenal of
the gangster. "240
233 Frye, supra note 227, at 59-60 (citing Demurrer to Indictment, United States v.
Miller, 26 E Supp. 1002 (WD. Ark. 1938)).
234 Id. at 64 (before becoming a judge, Hiram Heartsill Ragon represented Arkansas
in the U.S. Congress where he was an outspoken proponent of federal gun
control).
235 Id. at 60 (citing Memorandum Opinion, United States v. Miller, 26 E Supp.
1002 (WD. Ark. 1938)).
236 Miller, 307 U.S. at 176.
237 Frye, supra note 227, at 68 (noting Miller resurfaced in April 1939 when he and
some accomplices robbed an Oklahoma club while armed with shotguns. A few
days later, Miller's body was found along a creek, where he had been shot four
times with a .38 caliber gun).
238 Id. at 63-65.
239 Id. at 66 n. 127 (citing Brief for the United States at 8-9, United States v. Miller,
307 U.S. 174 (1939) (No. 696), 1939 WL 48353 ("The Second Amendment
does not confer upon the people the right to keep and bear arms; it is one of the
provisions of the Constitution which, recognizing the prior existence of a certain
right, declares that it shall not be infringed by Congress. Thus the right to keep
and bear arms is not a right granted by the Constitution and therefore is not
dependant [sic] upon that instrument for its source.").
240 Brief for the United States at 7-8, United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)

(No. 696), 1939 WL 48353.
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The Supreme Court decision that the Justice Department hoped
for did not materialize. Nearly all scholars dismiss Miller as "hopelessly
opaque,"241 and both individual and collective rights theorists claim their
arguments are bolstered by this opinion.242 Justice McReynolds, writing
for the majority, found that Congress had the constitutional power to
tax and regulate commerce, and such federal police involvement did not
improperly interfere with the states' police powers. 2 4 This finding bolstered
the Justice Department's efforts for an even greater law enforcement role.
Still, McReynolds' treatment of the Second Amendment offered a murky
view of an individual's right to firearms. After the obligatory historical
discussion,244 McReynolds states that it is "obvious" that the purpose
241 Frye, supra note 227, at 70 n.160 (citing David Yassky, The SecondrAmendment:
Structure, History and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 665 (2000)
("the opinion itself says very little")).
242 Id. at 69.
243 Id. at 73-74. McReynolds accepted the Justice Department's contention that, at
least on this point, the National Firearms Act was analogous with the Harrison
Narcotics Act. See Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914);
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919); Miller, 307 U.S. at 179; see
also Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 351-52 (1928); Alston v. United
States, 274 U.S. 289, 294 (1927); Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 17
(1925); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 94 (1919); United States v. Jin
Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 402 (1916). The Court had recently endorsed the
constitutionality of an expanded federal police effort in Sonzinsky v. United
States. 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937). Frye claims that by rejecting the Tenth
Amendment arguments against the NFA, it highlights the "implausibility" of
the Second Amendment claim, in that Miller would have to argue that the
Second Amendment prohibited the taxation of NFA firearms. McReynolds
found that whether or not the Second Amendment guarantees an individual
right to keep and bear arms, it hardly prohibits Congress from taxing particular
weapons. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
244 McReynolds wrote that "Most if not all of the States have adopted provisions
touching the right to keep and bear arms." Miller, 307 U.S. at 182. And he
reviewed the various colonial and early state laws that codified the citizens'
obligations to participate in the militia and their obligation of citizens to provide
and maintain certain equipment including firearms.
For example, in
Massachusetts, as of 1649, pikemen were required to be armed with "a pike,
corselet, head-piece, sword, and knapsack," while musketeers should carry a
"'good fixed musket,' not under bastard musket bore, not less than three feet,
nine inches, nor more than four feet three inches in length, a priming wire,
scourer, and mould, a sword, rest, bandoleers, one pound of powder, twenty
bullets, and two fathoms of match." Id. at 180. By 1784, Massachusetts required

278

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITYLAWJOURNAL Vol.3, No. 1

of the Second Amendment was to "assure the continuation and render
possible the effectiveness of [the militia]," and therefore, any question
arising under the Second Amendment must be decided "with that end
in view."245 McReynolds concluded that the NFA did not violate the
Second Amendment because the weapon involved was not suitable for
militia use or that "its use could contribute to the common defense." 246
McReynolds' opinion seems to hold that the Second Amendment does not
protect weapons used by criminals,247 and did not so much create a right
but guaranteed a pre-constitutional common law right.248 McReynolds
spends little time discussing the actual scope of the right to bear arms,
but his construction of the Amendment's terms seem to protect the
private ownership of firearms,249 and claims that the scope depends on
all able-bodied men between the ages of 16 and 40 to be part of the "militia" and
included all men under the age of 60 to be on the "alarm list," to "equip himself,
and be constantly provided with a good fire arm." Id. at 180-81 (citing Act,
Laws 1786, c. 25 April 4, 1786) (requiring able-bodied males who are citizens of
New York or any other state and residing in New York, between the ages of 16
and 45 to enroll in a militia company and provide at his own expense "a good
Musket or Firelock, a sufficient Bayonet and Belt, a Pouch with a Box therein to
contain not less than Twenty-four Cartridges suited to the Bore of his Musket or
Firelock, each Cartridge containing a proper Quantity of Powder and Ball, two
spare Flints, a Blanket and Knapsack"). In 1785, Virginia's General Assembly
required that all "free males" between the ages of 18 and 50 were to be organized
into companies and be required to train at a muster once every two months.
Non-commissioned officers were to have "a good, clean musket carrying an
ounce ball, and three feet eight inches long in the barrel, with a good bayonet
and iron ramrod well fitted thereto, a cartridge box properly made, to contain
and secure twenty cartridges fitted to his musket, a good knapsack and canteen"
as well as a pound of good powder, and four pounds of lead for the making of
ammunition. Id. at 181-82. Interestingly, the militia men west of the Blue
Ridge were allowed to carry rifles instead of muskets. Id. at 182. The Virginia
statute even provides for poor citizens to be provided with the needed arms and
supplies. Id. at 181-82 (citing 12 Hening's Statutes ch. 1, pt. 9 et seq.).
245 Id. at 178.
246 Id.

247 Frye, supra note 227, at 75.
248 Id. at 76.
249 Specifically, the Second Amendment terms "keep" meant "possess" and "bear"
meant "use." Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 ("In the absence of any evidence tending
to show that possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen
inches in length' at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation
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the differences in statutory language and the relevant state constitution
provisions.250
Frye states that McReynolds adopted a "traditional, commonsense
interpretation of the Second Amendment, assuming it guarantees
an individual right to possess and use firearms, subject to reasonable
regulation of time, place, and manner."251 Frye concludes the Miller
decision "left legislators a lot of wiggle room" to regulate, but not
prohibit, firearms.252 Still, the Miller decision dealt a blow to the efforts
of the Roosevelt Administration's attempt to significantly restrict gun use
through registration, taxation, and interstate commerce regulation. The
Miller decision instead seems to hold that registration of even militarytype weapons might be inconsistent with the Second Amendment.253
The Miller decision provided a precedent for Heller, but not a
good one. By finding an individual's right to bear arms under the rubric
of preserving the militia, McReynolds was attempting to put new wine
into an old skin. He was neither taking into account how society had
changed, nor was he clearly defining the right to bear arms for the 20th
century. Congress, its own interpreter of the Constitution, did a far better
job of sorting through the challenges facing the country and determining
the scope of the right to bear arms for the modern era.
Congress could have easily given the Justice Department what
it wanted, as it had on many pieces of crime legislation in the spring of
1934. Roosevelt's popularity, the overwhelming Democratic majorities
in Congress, and the nationwide crime crisis assured that he would get
nearly any piece of criminal justice legislation passed into law. Amazingly,
that did not happen with the NFA. The Justice Department had a vision
for the future of gun ownership in America, and the federal government
would be intimately involved. Rifles and long-barreled shotguns would
be allowed for hunting and sporting purposes, but all other guns would
be highly regulated. Through taxation and the regulation of commerce,
handguns would be registered and the federal government would be
aware of when and where the firearm was transferred. The new taxes

250
251
252
253

or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.").
Frye, supra note 227, at 76.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 82.
Halbrook, supra note 93, at 617 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178).
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would make gun ownership far more expensive, and would probably have
meant that only a few dealers would be left in the country. This power
could have even been extended to place prohibitively high taxes on all
firearms so that no one could afford to own, deal, or even manufacture a
handgun. Congress could have declared, as the Roosevelt Administration
seemed to want, that widespread private ownership of guns was now an
anachronism and that the Second Amendment was simply a collective
right held by a government-organized militia. The Ways and Means
Committee and Congress did not choose this course, although they
arguably had the constitutional authority to do so.
Why did Congress resist the Administration's wishes to pass
a high-profile part of its anti-crime legislative package? Many reasons
were offered to the Committee to refrain from encumbering handguns:
for hunting, for competitive target practice, to train people for future
military duty, to help train the newly-armed federal police how to shoot,
to support law enforcement, and for self-protection. The Committee's
report to the House cites only one reason to allow for an individual's
self-protection. There was no pretence by the Committee that an armed
citizenry was needed either for national defense through the militia, or
for civil law enforcement. Maybe the posse was still employed in rural
areas, but that too was changing with the spread of larger and ever more
sophisticated police departments in both urban areas and small towns.
The common defense, both military and law enforcement, was now almost
entirely in the hands of professionals, not an armed citizenry.25 4 Rather,
Congress limited the Bill's reach to weapons that were not useful for selfprotection by the average citizen and presented a public safety threat that
could not be addressed by any one locality or state, but only by the federal
government. The gangster presented a pressing problem combining the
use of machine guns and concealable shotguns with mobility from state
to state.
In the face of ever-expanding federal powers, the NFA represents
a triumph of federalism. The Committee's actions showed that Congress
would continue to rely heavily on the states to regulate firearms. The
254 See

ASSISTANT SEC'Y OF DEF., UNITED STATES HOME DEFENSES
58-59 (1981); Halbrook, supra note 93, at 630-31 (citing Report
ofthe Va. Adjutant Gen. for 1945, 23-24 (1946)). Still, private citizens provided
some support to national defense during World War II with sportsman and gun
clubs volunteering for state protective forces. Halbrook, supra note 93, at 631.
OFFICE OF THE

FORCES STUDY
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gangster problem had to be addressed, but Congress was clearly unwilling
to put into place regulations on all handguns nationally. The states were
better suited - both constitutionally through the police power and by
having a better understanding of local needs and mores - to decide what
level of gun regulation the population wanted or needed. This seems to
be in accord with the original intent of the Second Amendment. Who
was responsible for the common defense? It was a shared responsibility
between the federal, state, and local authorities. In reality, the federal
government would only become involved if extraordinary events of
national importance occurred. The primary day-to-day responsibility of
common defense was left to the state and local authorities. With the
NFA, Congress followed that framework: machine guns and sawed-off
shotguns had become a problem that only the federal government could
address. All other gun regulation should, until it became a truly national
problem, be left to the states to regulate.
Did the Second Amendment still have vitality for the 20th century?
What was the Second Amendment's scope in a world where militias were
no longer needed? In fashioning the NFA, Congress would take care to
regulate weapons that were used by criminals and to acknowledge the
right of law-abiding citizens to protect themselves with handguns, the
modern and popular weapon of choice.
Congress would continue to resist the efforts of the Roosevelt
Administration to register or otherwise restrict handguns. In 1940, the
Justice Department proposed amending the NFA to register guns, this
time not to fight gangsters, but to combat communist "subversives."255
255 Halbrook, supra note 93, at 618-19 (citing Op-Ed., 1940 Proposal: Register
Firearms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1989, at A31). In 1940, Attorney General
Robert H. Jackson suggested amending the 1934 NFA to register all firearms:
I desire to recommend legislation to require registration of
all firearms in the United States and a record of their
transfers, accompanied by the imposition of a nominal tax
on each transfer. Such a step would be of great importance
in the interests of national defense, as it would hamper the
possible accumulation of firearms on the part of subversive
groups. It is also of outstanding importance in the
enforcement of the criminal law ....
Id. at 619.
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Perhaps with an eye toward the use of gun registration laws by the Nazis
in Europe, Congress did not impose gun registration.256 In addition
to resisting Presidential efforts for gun registration, Congress also
made periodic statements in support of an individual's right to bear
arms. For example, in the Property Requisition Act of 1941, Congress
included language to prevent the Administration from abridging Second
Amendment rights.257 In defending the Act's language, representatives
made clear that the right to bear arms was an individually-held right.258
Even when passing gun control laws in the 1960s, Congress was careful to
256 Id. at 619. The German Law on Firearms and Ammunition required firearms
and ammunition acquisition permits and record keeping for all transactions.
When the Nazis came to power in 1933, they had knowledge of all firearms
owners. Hitler would later strictly regulate who could legally possess handguns.
The Justice Department's gun registration efforts ended once it became clear that
the Nazi government in Germany had used the German laws requiring the
registration of firearms to disarm portions of the population. Id.
257 H.R. REP. No. 1120, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941); Halbrook, supra note 93,
at 619 (citing Property Requisition Act, ch. 445, 55 Stat. 742 (1941)). This Act
authorized the President to requisition property from the private sector for fair
compensation. The Committee on Military Affairs explained that it was not
their intention to emulate the current destruction of personal liberties in
totalitarian countries and wanted Congress to make a clear expression in support
of an individual's right to bear arms and the Act included the following language:
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed (1) to authorize the requisitioning or require the registration
of any firearms possessed by any individual for his
personal protection or sport (and the possession of which
is not prohibited or the registration of which is not
required by existing law),.....[or]
(2) to impair or infringe in any manner the right of any individual
to keep and bear arms ....
Halbrook, supra note 93, at 624 (citing Property Requisition Act, ch.
455, 55 Stat. 742 (1941)).
258 For example, Representative May stated that, "the right to bear arms means a
man can keep a gun in his house and can carry it with him if he wants to; he can
take it where he wants to . . . and the right to bear arms means that he can go
hunting ... and that nobody has any right, so long as he bears the arms openly
and unconcealed, to interfere with him." 87 Cong. Rec. 6778, 7098 (1941).
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reaffirm an individual's right to bear arms. 259 Finally, in reporting the Firearms
Owner's Protection Act of 1986,260 the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that
the history, concept, and wording of the Second Amendment indicated that
it was "an individual right of a private citizen to own and carry firearms in a
peaceful manner."261
Second Amendment scholar Stephen P. Halbrook argues that these
congressional interpretations were directives to both the executive branch and
to state and local governments not to infringe the right through administrative
decisions, statements to the judiciary that "the right to keep arms is a
fundamental, individual right, and that statutes regulating this right should be
narrowly construed against the government and in favor of the people."262The
debate surrounding the NFA demonstrated that the right could be curtailed,
including the banning of entire classifications of weapons, by Congress if
there was a federal need to do so. The debate also shows that there was an
expectation that state and local government would take the primary role in
reasonably regulating gun ownership.
V. How DOES

THIS VISION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT SQUARE WITH

HELLER?

How does the Heller decision fit with the purpose of the Second
Amendment as conceived by the First Congress and as interpreted by the
congresses of the 20th and 21st centuries? In many ways, Scalia has improved
upon Second Amendment jurisprudence by clearly describing the right and
giving some shape to the level of protection citizens can expect. Although
I have described the right as being an individually-held right to keep and
259 The Gun Control Act of 1968 amended the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 and the
National Firearms Act of 1934, but was careful to state its recognition for the right of
individuals to own and use firearms for lawful purposes: "it is not the purpose of this
title to place any undue or unnecessary Federal Restrictions or burdens on law-abiding
citizens with respect to the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the
purpose of hunting, trap shooting, target shooting, personal protection, or any other
lawful activity, and that this title is not intended to discourage or eliminate the private
ownership or use of firearms by law-abiding citizens." The Gun Control Act of 1968,
18 U.S.C. § 101 (1968).
260 Firearms Owners' Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §921 (2006).
261 Halbrook, supra note 93, at 633 (citing The Right To Keep and Bear Arms: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1982)).

262 Id. at 641.
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bear arms outside of an organized military unit, Scalia's outcome is not
necessarily the right one.
Rather than characterizing the Second Amendment as a
codification of a widely-accepted common law right, Scalia should have
acknowledged that the Amendment was meant to address a specific
perceived defect in the Constitution regarding the common defense by
the various levels of government. This common defense, encompassing
both military and law enforcement aspects, ultimately relied upon a
widely understood, but poorly defined, majoritarian right to own and
use firearms. Since then, much has changed. The common defense is
now almost exclusively provided by professionals, lessening the need
for an armed citizenry. In addition, the use of firearms evolved into a
counter-majoritarian right requiring protection, first by the freedmen and
currently by today's gun owners, a minority of the overall population. This
different origin for the right changes the Second Amendment's nature and
scope. There should be less emphasis placed on the common law right to
own guns and more emphasis placed on the federalism-based balancing of
powers that the Second Amendment actually represents.
Because the "inherent right of self defense" is central to the Second
Amendment, Scalia held the District ofColumbia gun law unconstitutional
in Heller. The law violated the Second Amendment because it amounted
to a prohibition of an entire class of firearms that has been the preferred
method of self-protection.263 Scalia states that "handguns are the most
popular weapon of choice by Americans for self-defense in the home, and
a complete prohibition of their use is invalid."264 As a result, the District
had to allow Heller to register his handgun and issue him a license to
carry it in the home.265 While Scalia may be correct that the right to
bear arms is an individual right and that people have a right to protect
themselves, this hard and fast rule imposed on the states and localities
upends the constitutional order that the Second Amendment seeks to
preserve. The Second Amendment sought to prevent decisions made in
a faraway federal capitol from affecting the state or local government's
263 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 (2008). The District of
Columbia law totally banned handgun possession in the home and required that
any lawful firearm be rendered inoperable through a trigger lock or disassembling.
Id.
264 Id. at 2818.
265 Id. at 2822.
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ability to provide for the common defense. In the 18th century, that
protection meant keeping Congress from disarming people by restricting
them to militia arms that they could not use at home, and from disarming
states and localities by ignoring the militia or marching the most effective
fighters away from home for long periods of time. In the 21st century,
the purpose is the same, but the emphasis should be on allowing states
and localities to determine what is best for the modern "common defense"
through gun regulations.
Congress has done a better job at holding true to the original
purpose of the Second Amendment. The 1934 NFA debate shows that
Congress, unlike the Supreme Court in Miller, was able to put aside the
anachronistic militia arguments that plague Second Amendment debate.
Furthermore, the NFA debate shows that Congress, in the face of pressure
from the President and national interest groups, showed great restraint
in regulating firearms. This restraint was not shown in refusing to ban
a weapon of military usefulness - both the machine gun and sawed-off
shotguns have very legitimate military uses. Likewise, the restraint was
not reading the Second Amendment to prevent them from regulating
- nevermind banning - a whole class of legitimately popular or useful
weapons. After all, machine guns and shotguns were popular for banks
and private individuals to protect themselves on an equal footing with
gangsters.266 Even so, the Ways and Means Committee stated that, by
taxing and regulating those weapons, they would reserve their use to law
enforcement. Ultimately, Congress' restraint was based on the federalism
that is at the core of the Second Amendment. Although many members
of Congress wanted more done about handguns and felt it was within
their taxing powers to do so, they deferred to the states. Through their
traditional police powers, the states could impose regulations better
suited to the particular needs of its citizens. This precedent reflects the
original purpose of the Second Amendment far better than the muddled
preservation of the militia "standard" in Miller or the fanciful traditional
common law right at the heart of Heller.
In the 1930s, Congress recognized the importance of handguns to
266 Indeed, Professor Tushnet points out that semi-automatic weapons are popular
today and account for 15 percent of the privately held firearms in the country.
Yet a legislature may have very legitimate reasons to severely restrict or even ban
such weapons. Tushnet, Permissible Gun RegulationsAfter Heller: Speculations
About Methods and Outcomes, supra note 3, at 1440.
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personal protection. The Heller decision, however, raises the handgun to
the exalted status of something so important to the freedom of Americans
that its possession must be constitutionally protected against the whims
of state and local legislators. First, is a handgun the end-all of personal
protection just because it is popular? Couldn't reasonable regulation
allow personal protection while creating greater societal protection by
limiting traditional weapons like handguns and promoting various nonlethal weapons such as TASER guns or weapons with non-lethal bullets?
Perhaps, but the answer is unlikely to emerge from Congress or the
Supreme Court. The needs of the residents of a high crime, urban area
serviced by a large and sophisticated police department like Washington,
DC are very different from those of someone living on the shores of Lake
Mead in Nevada, miles away from the nearest deputy sheriff. Keeping
such important decisions at the state and local level, where "the people"
have the greatest influence over the law, made sense during the time of
the First Congress, and it makes sense now. 267 This is especially true in
jurisdictions where the resulting regulation is seen as an "outlier."268
Unfortunately, Heller - and now McDonald - have limited local
and state governments' ability to provide for the common defense. This is
a truly ironic use of the Second Amendment. For this reason, Miller may
267 The people of the early Republic understood this distinction and the need to
tailor gun laws accordingly. As Justice Breyer points out in his dissent, cities like
Boston, Philadelphia, and New York could place greater restrictions on gun use
within urban areas than existed in the rural areas. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2848-50
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
268 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 260. Professor Sunstein argues that Heller is a

minimalist decision in the tradition of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486 (1965), where an outlier statute was struck down because the Court
identified a national consensus on contraception and privacy. Sunstein, supra
note 4, at 260. Sunstein states that a strong majority of Americans support an
individual right to own guns for nonmilitary purposes, and the Washington,
DC law was one of the most draconian in the Nation. Id. at 263. In this case,
there is a serious question of federalism and divergent norms. Id. at 265. As
Professor Sunstein writes, "Should we not acknowledge the possibility
(likelihood!) that [an outlier] is responding to the distinctive values and
information of its own citizens and representatives, in a way that deserves
respect? Today's outlier is often tomorrow's norm." Id. I would go even further
to defend the outlier in that such instances in contradiction to the wishes of a
central and federal government or any broad national consensus was the very
genesis of the Second Amendment.

The SecondAmendment as Interpreted by Congress and the Court

287

be a superior decision. For all of its opaque references to preserving the
militia, Millerfound an individual right to bear arms, yet left great latitude
to legislatures and city councils to tailor gun laws to the community's
needs. Heller more clearly and comprehensively describes the individual
right, but gives little guidance to legislators when crafting future gun laws.
Handguns must be allowed, but what about cheap unreliable handguns
like "Saturday Night Specials"? In addition, what other future popular
weapons will merit constitutional protection under Heller and McDonald?
How should Congress and legislatures proceed? Justice Breyer's
dissent in Heller takes the majority to task for not establishing a level of
scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment restrictions. Breyer suggests
an interest-balancing inquiry that would weigh a statute's burden on a
protected interest that is out of proportion to the statute's effects on other
important governmental interests.269 Unfortunately, Scalia belittles this
suggestion in that no other enumerated rights' core protections have been
subjected to such interest-balancing tests. Still, legislatures and courts
alike will be balancing rights against reasonable protections for society,
and need some standard of review. This issue may very well default to
a rational basis standard of review, meaning few if any restrictions on
representatives when drafting future gun legislation.270
Scalia again returns to his new originalism and states,
"Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood
to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures
or (yes) even future judges think that scope is too broad."271 The fact is that
the citizens of the early republic could not conceive of a handgun, more
powerful than any then-existing musket or rifle, easily concealable, and
capable of being carried in public without anyone knowing the person was
armed. What they did understand was that government closest to them
best understood their needs and could best tailor gun laws to balance the
needs of individuals with those of society. By giving blanket protection
269 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817. Justice Breyer suggests that the DC ordinances at
issue in Heller would survive such a test. Id. at 2817 n.27.
270 See Tushnet, PermissibleGun Regulations After Heller: SpeculationsAbout Methods
and Outcomes, supra note 3, at 1429-31. Professor Tushnet speculates that
courts will use a standard of "rational basis with bite" as the Second Amendment
issue "percolate [s]" in the lower courts and the blank areas left by Heller are filled
in.
271 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
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to handguns, the Court has imposed the will of Washington on states
and municipalities. The Court has done harm to the spirit of the Second
Amendment in the name of protecting it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Like nearly all examinations of the Second Amendment, the
Heller decision is a battle of historical precedents. Justice Scalia calls upon
cases and commentary from the British Bill of Rights and Blackstone, to
19th century judges and legal scholars. He would have been better served
looking at how Congress, that often-underappreciated interpreter of the
Constitution, interpreted the Second Amendment for a modern age of
professional soldiers and police officers. Despite the disappearance of the
militia, does the Second Amendment still have vitality? In 1934, Congress
decided that it did, not by declaring that regulations were impermissible
or by protecting a class of weapons, but by deferring to state and local
government for nearly all of that regulation. The federal legislature would
only impose its will over gun policy when it had to, and only as far as
was absolutely necessary to address a problem of national scope. Short
of extraordinary circumstances, the federal government would play a very
limited role providing the day-to-day common defense. In creating the
National Firearms Act, Congress acknowledged and followed the balance
of power created by the Second Amendment. The Court should have
done the same in Heller and McDonald.

